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The role of accounting is to provide financial information to the stakeholders of a firm.
Investors as capital market participants use the information conveyed in financial reports
for firm valuation. By doing so, they evaluate the reports and aim to identify the under-
lying performance. On the other hand, firm managers are often compensated based on
financial statements. This causes adverse incentives to misrepresent accounting numbers
which can lead to earnings management.
The presence of earnings management can deteriorate the usefulness of accounting for
firm valuation and mitigate the efficiency in capital markets. In my thesis, I analyze earn-
ings management with a focus on three different subjects: reputational concerns, mergers
& acquisitions (M&A) and investor sophistication.
Chapter 1 comprises the joint study of Ulrich Schäfer and me which is based on the sem-
inal work of Fischer and Verrecchia (2000). We study managers’ reporting bias if the
report is not only used by the capital market, but also by the labor market to address the
question on how financial incentives and reputational concerns affect capital market effi-
ciency. To this end, we assume that the manager has private information on her incentives.
Hence, reporting bias cannot be perfectly backed out from financial reports. Furthermore,
firm value is the sum of two components: asset value and managerial talent. While the
capital market is interested in total firm value, the labor market assesses only the man-
ager’s talent.
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) show that when financial reports are only processed by
the capital market as a single user, increasing uncertainty leads to additional demand
for information which improves value relevance and price efficiency. We show that this
does not necessarily hold true if multiple stakeholders use the report: If the labor mar-
ket additionally uses the report for talent assessment, increasing fundamental uncertainty
has countervailing effects. Higher uncertainty leads to higher market reactions which in
turn increases biasing incentives and therefore reporting noise. Higher uncertainty about
managerial talent generally improves labor market efficiency, but the additional reporting
noise potentially decreases value relevance and price efficiency in the capital market. This
is particularly the case if markets’ uncertainty about reporting incentives are sufficiently
high and if talent uncertainty is low compared to the overall fundamental uncertainty.
Preface 2
In Chapter 2, I study earnings management in an M&A transaction where a target firm
is sold to a buyer. Therefore, I examine the consequences of misreporting incentives on
reporting bias, value relevance and price efficiency to provide a possible theoretical ex-
planation on empirical evidence for low price efficiency and overpayment in M&A.
I model a two-stage reporting game according to Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) with
a target manager who reports firm value to an intermediary such as an investment bank
or consulting firm hired by the seller. The intermediary tries to remove the manager’s
bias and reports firm value to the buyer, thereby biasing its own report. The seller pays
a success fee to the intermediary that is of particular interest to my analysis because it
affects biasing incentives of both, the manager and the intermediary.
I find that the buyer’s reaction coefficient on the intermediary report as an indicator for
value relevance is always maximized for a success fee of zero. In this case, the inter-
mediary reports his best estimate of firm value. On the other hand, price efficiency can
be increasing or decreasing in success fee, depending on the relative uncertainty about
biasing incentives of the manager and the intermediary. An increasing success fee has
two countervailing effects on price efficiency: The intermediary’s biasing incentives are
increasing in success fee which reduces price efficiency but then a higher fee simulta-
neously decreases the manager’s incentives to bias, resulting in an increasing price effi-
ciency. However, if there is uncertainty about both players’ incentives, price efficiency is
always maximized for an interior solution of success fee between zero and one.
In Chapter 3, Robert F. Göx and I study the effect of investor sophistication on earnings
management. We examine the question on how different investor types affect managerial
misreporting and price efficiency. To this end, we extend the linear rational expectations
model of Goldstein and Yang (2017) with a reporting game. The manager of a firm issues
an accounting report to a capital market where the firm’s stock is traded as a risky asset.
In addition to informed, uninformed and liquidity traders, we follow Hirshleifer and Teoh
(2003) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011) by introducing limited attention traders as
a fourth investor category. Both, informed and uninformed traders attend to stock price
and public report while the former additionally observe a private signal about firm value.
Limited attention traders exhibit limited information processing capacity and base their
stock demand solely on the public report issued by the manager. The demand of liquidity
traders is stochastic and based on exogenous reasons.
Preface 3
In line with previous studies, we find that a higher degree of investor sophistication rep-
resented by a higher (lower) proportion of informed (limited attention) traders reduces
the price response to the accounting report and therefore earnings management incen-
tives. However, a further decline in investor sophistication through a higher fraction of
liquidity traders can increase earnings management due to countervailing effects: More
liquidity traders in the market imply a lower sensitivity of the aggregate demand for shares
to the accounting report and, simultaneously, increase the aggregate valuation risk which
reduces the sensitivity of demand to changes of the share price. Since the first effect
decreases and the second effect increases earnings management, the overall impact is am-
biguous.
Contrary to empirical evidence, we show that price efficiency can be increasing in limited
attention: An increase in the fraction of limited attention traders decreases both, the co-
variance between value and price and the variance of the price. Because price efficiency is
negatively affected by a lower covariance but positively affected by a lower price volatility,
price efficiency is increasing in limited attention if the latter effect dominates the former.
Overall, our results suggest that a careful definition of investor sophistication is crucial
for empirical research in this field.
Chapter 1. Effects of Financial Incentives and Reputational Concerns on Reporting Bias 4
Chapter 1
Effects of Financial Incentives and Reputational
Concerns on Reporting Bias∗
Abstract
We study managers’ decisions to bias financial reports if these reports are used by capi-
tal and labor markets to learn about firm value and managerial talent. If managers have
private information on their financial and reputational incentives, we identify interactions
in the capital and labor markets’ use of reports: The reception of reports in one market
motivates reporting bias, which reduces value relevance and price efficiency in the other
market. This interaction changes established results and has implications for financial
reporting standard setters: We characterize environments where capital market efficiency
can be improved by eliminating information on managerial talent from financial reports
– even if this information is relevant for investors. This is particularly the case if there
is high uncertainty about managers’ reputational concerns and if talent uncertainty repre-
sents a small part of the overall fundamental uncertainty.
Keywords: reporting bias, reputation, market efficiency, reporting users
∗ This thesis chapter is based on the unpublished working paper:
Feller, Miró and Ulrich Schäfer (2019). “Deceiving Two Masters: The Effects of Financial Incentives and
Reputational Concerns on Reporting Bias”, University of Zurich.
A version of this paper has been submitted to The Accounting Review and is under review.
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1.1 Introduction
In past decades, several severe cases of earnings management have attracted public at-
tention. They usually were followed by debates on dysfunctional effects of equity-based
incentives: Rewarding managers for changes in stock price potentially motivates them to
misrepresent the economic situation of the firm, for instance by using their discretion in
biasing financial reports (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006; Crocker and Slemrod, 2007). The
public debate focuses on financial incentives. Yet, there are other reasons for managers to
misreport earnings. In a survey of 169 CFOs, Dichev et al. (2013) find that “80.4% be-
lieve that senior managers misrepresent earnings to avoid adverse career consequences”.
This should not be surprising as academic literature on incentive provision emphasizes
the role of reputation and career considerations in managerial decision making. Even
in the absence of explicit financial incentives, managers try to signal talent to create job
opportunities and influence future compensation (e.g., Fama, 1980; Holmström, 1982).
Preparers of financial reports arguably encounter both types of incentives when making
their reporting choices. We therefore consider the joint effect of financial incentives and
reputational concerns on a manager’s decision to bias statutory reports. Financial reports
convey information on both firm profitability and the talent of the management in place.
They serve the dual purpose of informing investors about firm value and providing infor-
mation about the management, which can be used by future employers. Thus, managers
are tempted to inflate financial reports (i) to mislead the capital market and increase their
variable compensation and (ii) to build up reputation in the labor market.
A key assumption in our study is that capital and labor markets face uncertainty about
managers financial and reputational incentives.1 Financial incentives may be unknown
because outsiders do not know the details of managers’ compensation arrangements and
private stock holdings (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000). Benefits of managerial rep-
utation are potentially realized in the distant future. Thus, asymmetric information with
regard to reputational concerns may result from managers’ unknown career plans and
1 Ferri, Zheng, and Zou (2018) find that investors’ earnings response depends on the availability of pub-
lic information on managers’ compensation arrangements. This indicates that uncertainty about managers’
financial incentives is relevant in real reporting environments. Moreover, price reactions to voluntary depar-
tures indicate that markets are unable to anticipate managers’ career-related decisions. A recent example
is the 8.4% stock price drop of Netflix, Inc. following the announcement that its CFO David Wells has
decided to step down, see Ramachandran and Trentmann (2018).
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individual time preferences. If managers’ reporting objectives are uncertain, their bias
cannot be perfectly backed out from financial reports but is associated with noise.2
Given this assumption, we find that financial incentives and reputational concerns have
interrelated effects. Capital and labor market efficiency are reduced if the financial report
is simultaneously used in both markets to learn about the firm value and managerial talent.
To provide intuition for this result, assume that the labor market uses the financial report
to update beliefs about managerial talent. This creates incentives for the manager to over-
state firm performance. Because financial investors are uncertain about the strength of the
manager’s reputational motives, they anticipate that the manager manipulates the report,
however they do not know how much bias is added. Thus, information on firm value is
diluted and investors curtail the usage of the report to update their beliefs. Following this
logic, increasing usage of the financial report in the labor market reduces its usefulness in
the capital market and vice versa.
We show that the interactions of financial and reputational incentives challenge previously
established results. Existing literature concludes that higher uncertainty about fundamen-
tal information improves value relevance and price efficiency. It creates additional de-
mand for information and increases the value of financial reports in reducing uncertainty
(Holmström, 1982; Narayanan, 1985; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000). In our setting, man-
agerial talent represents fundamental information in the labor market and in the capital
market as it affects firm value. One might therefore expect that higher talent uncertainty
improves capital and labor market efficiency. Yet, we identify cases where capital market
efficiency decreases in the uncertainty about talent: We show that higher talent uncertainty
generally amplifies earnings response in the labor market. This increases incentives to
bias the report. The additional reporting noise potentially overcompensates the increased
demand for information in the capital market.
Our results have implications for the design of financial reporting standards. A prominent
objective of standard setters is to provide information that affects investors’ firm valu-
ations. For instance, the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting directs
firms to report information which is relevant to investors and creditors independent of
its relevance to other reporting users. This includes information on managerial contri-
2 Beyer, Guttman, and Marinovic (2018) find strong evidence for the occurrence and impact of such
reporting noise.
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bution to firm value (IASB, 2018: OB4 and OB10). We find ambiguous effects of such
regulation. Requiring firms to report on managerial talent increases the weight that labor
markets assign to reports and aggravates reporting noise. This may reduce value relevance
of financial reports in capital markets – even if talent information is relevant to investors.
We find that reporting on managerial contribution to firm value may reduce capital market
efficiency if (i) there is high uncertainty about managers’ reputational concerns and (ii)
talent uncertainty represents only a small part of the overall fundamental uncertainty.
On a general level, our results indicate risks in mandating additional information in finan-
cial reports, which are not only relevant for financial investors as primary users but also
for other stakeholders such as business partners, competitors, rating agencies and the au-
thorities. If such stakeholders increasingly use financial reports as an information source,
managers face complex incentives to dissemble, which aggravate the investors’ problem
to understand and back out reporting bias. Initiatives to increase the informational con-
tent of financial reports might therefore backfire and undermine the credibility of reports.
This could be one explanation for the mixed empirical evidence of value relevance stud-
ies: Although standard setters have extended and refined reporting requirements over
the past decades, empirical studies hardly identify an increase of value relevance of ac-
counting information (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001;
Gu, 2007). Our results show similarities to existing work on relevance-reliability trade
offs: Requiring firms to report more extensive information on firm value may have unde-
sirable consequences if the corresponding standards offer managers additional discretion
to bias reports. In contrast to this literature, reporting bias in our setting does not re-
sult from increased leeway in accounting but from additional reporting users, which are
interested in the supplemental information and add incentives to bias financial reports.
Our analysis contributes to three strands of literature. First, our results are related to the
literature on biased financial reporting. Previous work uses signal-jamming models to
study how managers’ financial incentives and reputational concerns affect earnings man-
agement and market efficiency. The seminal literature assumes that managerial incentives
are common knowledge. Stein (1989) studies investment decisions of managers who are
interested in maximizing the short-term stock price. Managers choose suboptimal invest-
ment levels and inflate current earnings even though this behavior is rationally anticipated
by the market. Similar results are obtained if managers have reputational concerns: Holm-
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ström (1982) shows that even in the absence of explicit financial incentives managers exert
productive effort to manage the labor market’s expectations of their unobservable talent.
While this outcome might be desirable if firms are unable to provide contractual incen-
tives, Narayanan (1985) illustrates detrimental consequences of reputational concerns. In
all these models, earnings management is an equilibrium outcome, but managers fail to
deceive the markets. Their decisions are correctly anticipated and do not affect the ability
to learn about firm value and managerial talent.
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) show that this result depends on the assumption that man-
agers’ reporting objectives are publicly known. If investors face uncertainty about a man-
ager’s equity-based incentives, reporting bias dilutes the informational content of the fi-
nancial report and reduces the capital market’s ability to make inferences on firm value.3
In this case, higher uncertainty about the manager’s incentives reduces capital market ef-
ficiency while higher uncertainty about firm fundamentals increases value relevance and
price efficiency.4 We use a similar model framework assuming that firm value partly
reflects managerial talent and managers face both financial incentives and reputational
concerns. While there is other work addressing the joint effects of financial incentives
and reputational concerns (e.g., Prendergast and Stole, 1996; Milbourn, Shockley, and
Thakor, 2001), we are the first to consider asymmetric information on both types of in-
centives. We identify an interaction in the capital and labor market use of financial reports
that challenges well-known comparative statics results and allows for novel empirical pre-
dictions: Although higher fundamental uncertainty creates additional demand for infor-
mation, it may reduce earnings response and price efficiency in the capital market.
Second, our study complements the existing literature on interactions of financial incen-
tives and reputational concerns. The career concerns literature studies optimal financial
incentives in the presence of reputational concerns.5 In his seminal work, Fama (1980)
3 Related work uses the assumption of uncertain reporting objectives to study reversal effects of re-
porting bias (Sankar and Subramanyam, 2001), relevance-reliability trade-offs in accounting (Dye and
Sridhar, 2004), the interplay of real and accounting earnings management (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005)
and implications for firms’ voluntary disclosure decisions (Einhorn and Ziv, 2012; Heinle and Verrec-
chia, 2016).
4 Uncertainty about managers’ reporting objectives does not necessarily result from unknown incentives.
For example, Dye and Sridhar (2004) consider unknown costs of misreporting and find similar results.
5 Career concerns models typically employ a specific set of assumptions: Managers have unobservable
ability to increase firm value; all parties hold symmetric ex ante beliefs about managerial ability; future
compensation reflects the labor market’s beliefs about talent. Our model shares some of these features.
However, we do not explicate the formation of compensation contracts and do not require symmetric ex
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emphasizes the role of labor markets in disciplining managerial behavior. He delineates a
dynamic model framework, in which incentives are provided implicitly by the wage revi-
sion process in a competitive labor market. Fama (1980) argues that reputational concerns
play a natural role in motivating managers and may be a substitute for explicit financial
incentives. Subsequent studies substantiate these results (e.g., Holmström, 1982; Gibbons
and Murphy, 1992).6 For instance, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that in the presence
of implicit incentives, firms optimize total incentives: If reputational concerns are strong,
optimal contracts provide only weak financial incentives. In contrast to this strand of lit-
erature, we view financial incentives and reputational concerns from a market perspective
rather than a firm perspective: We do not consider optimal contracts in the presence of
implicit incentives, but study the joint effect of given financial incentives and reputational
concerns on market reactions and market efficiency.
Third, we contribute to the literature studying the effects of managers’ reputational mo-
tives on capital market efficiency. Nagar (1999) addresses firms’ decisions on voluntary
disclosure if managers maximize the market assessment of their talent. If there is uncer-
tainty about the publicly available information and the corresponding market valuation,
(risk-averse) managers might strategically withhold private information. In line with our
results, reputational concerns have detrimental effects on price efficiency. Beyer and Dye
(2012) consider managers’ decisions on disclosing (unfavorable) financial forecasts when
their information endowment is unknown. They find that even strategic managers might
disclose unfavorable information in early periods to increase the credibility of future non-
disclosure decisions. In contrast to our study, they do not address managers’ reputation
to increase firm value, but their reputation to be forthcoming, i.e., to disclose all available
information. While we study a mandatory reporting setting, both Nagar (1999) and Beyer
and Dye (2012) consider decisions on (verifiable) voluntary disclosure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, we explain our model and
characterize the reporting equilibrium. The benchmark analysis is presented in Section
1.3. Section 1.4 provides our main results with regard to market efficiency and reporting
bias. In Section 1.5, we discuss implications for reporting standard design. Section 1.6
ante information. We therefore refer more generally to reputational concerns instead of career concerns.
6 Other literature deals with optimal job design (Kaarbøe and Olsen, 2006; Casas-Arce and
Hejeebu, 2012), the reporting environment (Autrey, Dikolli, and Newman, 2007) and performance mea-
sure aggregation (Autrey, Dikolli, and Newman, 2010; Arya and Mittendorf, 2011).
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considers two model extensions to illustrate the effects of correlated fundamentals and
multiple reporting users. In Section 1.7, we summarize the results and conclude.
1.2 Model setup
The manager of a publicly traded firm privately observes information about the firm value
and releases a (potentially biased) financial report. This report is used by the capital and
labor markets to update their beliefs about the firm fundamentals.7 Before receiving in-
formation, the manager shares the market participants’ ex ante beliefs about the structure
and distribution of firm value. We assume that firm value is the sum of two normally
distributed components:
ṽ = η̃ + θ̃. (1)
The component η̃ ∼ N(0, σ2η) represents all aspects of firm value which are not related to
the manager in place. It comprises the value created by all tangible and intangible assets
independent of managerial influence. We refer to this component as the asset value of
the firm. The component θ̃ ∼ N(0, σ2θ) is the managerial contribution to firm value and
epitomizes the talent of the manager in place.8 In our main analysis, we assume that
the asset value and managerial talent are stochastically independent, i.e., Cov[η̃, θ̃] = 0.9





The manager receives a private signal revealing both the asset value η and talent com-
ponent θ of firm value.10 For instance, this signal might represent internal information
7 Real reporting environments are characterized by multiple stakeholders interested in various aspects of
firm value and thus providing incentives to manipulate the information content. In Section 1.6, we show
that our main results carry over to a setting with more than two reporting users.
8 Expected asset value and talent do not affect our results qualitatively and are normalized to zero.
9 This assumption excludes potential interactive effects of the asset value and managerial talent – a typical
simplification in the literature (e.g., Holmström, 1982; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Nagar, 1999). However,
we acknowledge that complementarities in firms’ production functions are likely to exist: More profitable
firms hire talented managers and, in turn, these managers increase the profitability of the available resources
(see Murphy and Zábojník, 2004; Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008). In Section 1.6 we allow for
positive correlation of η̃ and θ̃ to study the additional effects of such complementarities.
10 The results of our main analysis do not depend on whether the manager receives disaggregate informa-
tion on both components or only on aggregate firm value. It seems realistic to assume that an experienced
manager holds private information on her talent. Thus, an additional signal of aggregate firm value allows
her to make inferences on the realized asset value.
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provided by the firm’s accounting system which are not publicly observable.11 Subse-
quently, the manager must issue a public financial report on firm value. We assume that
she can engage in (accounting) earnings management, that is she can overstate or under-
state firm value in her report r by adding a positive or negative bias b = r−v. Misreporting




· (r − v)2 = 1
2
· b2. (2)
Such costs result from the time-consuming process of finding and using leeway in finan-
cial reporting standards as well as conflicts with auditors and potential legal liabilities if
earnings management is detected.
The capital and labor markets cannot observe any other information about the firm value
or its components, but form their beliefs based on the financial report. While there may
be alternative ways for managers to signal talent, financial reports are particularly useful
for this purpose. They reflect the manager’s performance in a real business environment.
Furthermore, audited financial reports are arguably more credible than most other in-
formation channels. We view capital and labor markets as symmetric and risk-neutral
institutions, which efficiently process the available information. They differ only in the
fundamental value evaluated. The capital market price P reflects all available information
on firm value ṽ = η̃+ θ̃13 and the talent assessment T in the labor market represents public
11 We assume that the accounting signal perfectly reveals firm value. Allowing for noisy accounting
measurement does not affect our results qualitatively.
12 Many earnings management studies advance the view that misreporting may be accompanied by con-
siderable costs for managers (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Dye and Sridhar, 2004). This assumption
is reasonable in our setting of mandatory disclosure where the content of financial reports is regulated by
standard setters and firms are subject to legal enforcement. We therefore do not consider a cheap talk set-
ting (see Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Stocken, 2000; Bertomeu and Marinovic, 2016). For an overview of
disclosure models with both costless and costly signaling see Stocken (2013).
13 There is empirical evidence that capital market prices incorporate managerial contributions to firm
value. For instance, Johnson et al. (1985) and Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth (2016) document abnormal
stock price reactions in cases of sudden executive deaths. Nam, J. Ronen, and T. Ronen (2018) show that
information on managerial decisions at previous employers affects the current employer’s stock price.
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information on the manager’s talent θ̃ as one component of firm value:14
P = E [ṽ|r] and T = E[θ̃|r]. (3)
We assume that the manager’s utility U depends on both the market price P as well as the
assessment T of her talent. The marginal increase of her utility in the market outcomes is
given by the incentive weights xP and xT respectively:
U = xP · P + xT · T − c(r). (4)
We do not endogenize incentives but view xP and xT as summation of the manager’s given
explicit and implicit interest in the market outcomes.15 She privately knows the weights
xP and xT while the capital and labor markets are uncertain about their realizations.
16
The incentive weight xP represents the manager’s aggregate financial incentives in the
firm’s market price. This includes incentives to increase the market price like equity-
based compensation, but also implicit incentives to decrease the price, for instance in the
case of share repurchases. The incentive weight xT reflects the manager’s reputational
incentives: By signaling talent to the labor market, the manager gains reputation. Such
reputation is typically related to job opportunities and higher future compensation levels
(e.g., Holmström, 1982). Managers differ in their exposure xT to the talent assessment.
For instance, prior studies argue that particularly young managers benefit from high tal-
ent assessment and show strong reputational concerns (e.g., Prendergast and Stole, 1996).
14 This assumption is typical for career concern models. In contrast, Murphy and Zábojník (2004), Mur-
phy and Zábojník (2007) and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) suggest that there are firm-specific and general
talent components where only the latter are transferable between firms. Our results hold qualitatively if we
assume that talent θ is the weighted sum of firm-specific and general talent.
15 For an analysis of optimal incentives when managers provide productive effort and manipulate earnings
see Goldman and Slezak (2006), Dutta and Fan (2014) and Peng and Röell (2014).
16 We follow existing work and use a static reduced-form model to study the effects of misreporting (e.g.,
Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Dye and Sridhar, 2004; Heinle and Verrecchia, 2016). The incentive weights
xP and xT render the net incentives to bias reports considering all future consequences of misreporting.
We do not explicitly model bias reversals under clean surplus accounting nor do we delineate a (dynamic)
contracting framework that implies the utility (4). In this regard, we deviate from career concerns models
and borrow from disclosure models, which do not provide microstructure of reporting incentives (e.g.,
Nagar, 1999). The assumption that managers maximize the market price of their talent is not farfetched
and could result from the fact that expected talent determines future wages (Holmström, 1982). Then, the
incentive weight xT could reflect the manager’s negotiation power (Meyer and Vickers, 1997) or be a “proxy
for the length of the agent’s career horizon” (Autrey, Dikolli, and Newman, 2010).
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Following this argument, xT may reflect the manager’s age. Moreover, note that xT rep-
resents the evaluation of future wages. There may be considerable differences in the
individual discounting of future compensation (see Holmström and Costa, 1986; Reichel-
stein, 1997). This could be a result of the individuals’ time preferences or career planning.
Managers might face high private costs of changing affiliations or are reluctant to change
jobs because of attractive internal career opportunities and retention incentives. For this
type of manager, talent assessment is less relevant. Negative values of xT are characteris-
tic of managers who fear the additional responsibility and higher expectations associated
with positive talent assessments.17
We assume that the capital and labor markets have common beliefs about the distribution
of incentives, x̃P ∼ N(µP, σ2P) and x̃T ∼ N(µT , σ2T ) with µP, µT ≥ 0.18 It is reasonable to
assume that the manager’s incentives are not observable by the markets. This is obvious
in the case of financial incentives if compensation contracts, bonus arrangements or the
manager’s private stock holdings are not fully disclosed. While managerial age as one de-
terminant of reputational concerns is observable, there are other determinants, which can
hardly be assessed by the market. For example, firms use incentives to retain managers:
In many cases, managers suffer considerable losses in deferred compensation, pension
claims or other perks like specific loan conditions if they retire. Such contractual clauses
are not necessarily public and affect the power of managers’ reputational concerns. More-
over, potential benefits of reputation are realized somewhere in the future. Their impact
on managers’ decisions depends on career plans and individual preferences (for instance,
career horizons and time preferences), which are unobservable for firm outsiders.
We analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria of this reporting game characterized by
(i) the manager’s reporting strategy r(η, θ, xP, xT ), which maximizes her utility (4) for
given asset value and talent realizations η and θ as well as incentive weights xP and
xT and conjectures P̂(r) and T̂ (r) about the markets’ reactions to her report,
(ii) the capital and labor market prices P(r) and T (r) as functions of the financial report
r according to (3) for given conjecture r̂(η, θ, xP, xT ) about the manager’s strategy,
17 Note that our results do not hinge on the fact that xT may be negative. Our results hold even if the
probability of negative xT is arbitrarily small.
18 We study a manager’s reputation to increase firm value if there is uncertainty about her talent. In-
stead, we could assume that the manager has private information on her costs of misreporting (see Dye
and Sridhar, 2004) and cares for her reputation to report truthfully. Both types of reputation imply similar
results.
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(iii) the condition that all conjectures are self-fulfilling, i.e., r̂(·) = r(·), P̂(·) = P(·) and
T̂ (·) = T (·).
As typical in the accounting literature, we restrict our analysis to linear equilibria, i.e.,
the manager’s reporting strategy r(·) as well as the capital and labor market outcomes P(·)
and T (·) are linear functions of the available information.1920 In line with previous work,
we use two measures of market efficiency to evaluate reporting equilibria (e.g., Fischer
and Verrecchia, 2000; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Heinle and Verrecchia, 2016). First,
we study the earnings response coefficients (ERCs)
βP ≡ dP/dr and βT ≡ dT/dr (5)
in the capital and labor markets. These measures reflect the sensitivity of the market
outcomes to the firm’s accounting information. They have been used in the theoretical
literature as proxies of value relevance. Second, we analyze the relative reduction of





Var[θ̃] − Var[θ̃|T ]
Var[θ̃]
. (6)
The termsΠP andΠT measure the extent to which all public and private information about
fundamentals is incorporated into market prices. We follow the literature in interpreting
theses measures as proxies for price efficiency in the capital and labor markets.22
Proposition 1 proves the existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium.23
19 The restriction to linear strategies allows us to focus on a single equilibrium. Einhorn and Ziv (2012)
show that this restriction is useful to rule out unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
20 See Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel (2006) for a more general equilibrium analysis in a model with only
financial incentives. The study characterizes equilibria with partial pooling. Even if there is no uncertainty
about managers’ reporting objectives, investors are no longer able to back out reporting bias.
21 Market efficiency has been extensively studied in capital market settings, but is typically not considered
in labor market models. Studies of reputational concerns typically assume that there is no uncertainty about
the value of reputation for managers. In consequence, reporting bias is anticipated and can be backed out
from the report. In our setting of uncertain reputational incentives, labor market efficiency is a valid question
because bias is accompanied by reporting noise.
22 Other measures of market efficiency comprise entropy measures (Huang, 2016; Jiang and Yang, 2017)
or the (negative) expected squared difference between reported and true value (Fischer and Stocken, 2004).
In our model setting, all three alternative definitions coincide.
23 Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium ERCs implicitly. We refrain from stating the explicit solu-
tions as they do not provide additional insights.
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Proposition 1 If the manager is motivated by financial incentives and reputational con-
cerns, there exists a unique linear equilibrium with the following properties:24
























The equilibrium strategies have a very intuitive interpretation. The manager chooses the
bias level considering both her financial and reputational motives. The equilibrium bias
level b trades off the marginal benefits and costs of dissembling. The former depend on
the markets’ responsiveness to the financial report: If it is easier to influence the markets,
(i.e., for higher levels of βP and βT ), the manager chooses a higher bias level. The capital
and labor markets’ equilibrium ERCs reflect the reported information on firm value and
talent respectively, βP = Cov[ṽ, r̃] · Var[r̃]−1 and βT = Cov[θ̃, r̃] · Var[r̃]−1.
The equilibrium results are useful to determine the measures of market efficiency. It turns
out that value relevance and price efficiency are identical measures: The degree to which
rational markets rely on the financial report corresponds to its usefulness in reducing
uncertainty about fundamentals.25 Based on this observation, we focus on the analysis of
the market ERCs knowing that they represent both value relevance and price efficiency.
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, the measures of price efficiency and value relevance coin-
cide, i.e., ΠP = βP and ΠT = βT .
1.3 Benchmark analysis
Previous literature focuses on settings, in which managers’ reports are either motivated
exclusively by financial incentives (xT = 0, i.e., µT = σ
2
T = 0) or by reputational motives
(xP = 0, i.e., µP = σ
2
P = 0). Lemma 1 summarizes comparative static results in these
special cases of our model.26
24 All proofs are provided in the appendix.
25 The congruence of value relevance and price efficiency does not necessarily hold in a multi-stage re-
porting environment as considered by Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010).
26 Let βB
P
= βP|xT=0 and β
B
T
= βT |xP=0 denote the capital and labor market ERCs in the benchmark cases.
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Lemma 1 Results with either financial incentives or reputational concerns:
a) Consider the case that the manager only pursues financial objectives (xT = 0).
Higher uncertainty about the firm value (i.e., asset value η̃ or talent θ̃) improves
earnings response βBP in the capital market.
b) If the manager is motivated by reputational objectives only (xP = 0), higher uncer-
tainty about her talent θ̃ improves earnings response in the labor market. In contrast,
higher uncertainty about the asset value η̃ reduces the labor market response βBT .
If the manager is not motivated by reputational concerns but seeks to maximize the firm’s
market price, higher uncertainty about asset value or managerial talent generally improves
capital market efficiency. As there is more demand for information, financial reports be-
come more valuable and are used increasingly by investors, i.e., the ERC in the cap-
ital market increases (dβBP/dσ
2
k
> 0 for k ∈ {η, θ}).27 These effects occur whenever
investors use (biased) financial reports to learn about firm value (e.g., Holthausen and
Verrecchia, 1988; Stein, 1989; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000).28
In the absence of financial incentives, the manager’s reputational concerns have similar
effects. Higher uncertainty about her talent makes financial reports more useful for po-
tential employers. Thus, the labor market ERC increases, dβBT/dσ
2
θ > 0. While talent θ is
fundamental information for both markets, the asset value η represents noise for the labor
market. It dilutes the talent information without having any explanatory value. In con-
sequence, higher uncertainty about the asset value attenuates the labor market response,
dβBT/dσ
2
η < 0. These observations are in line with the results of the literature on reputa-
tional concerns (Narayanan, 1985; Holmström, 1982; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992).
The generalization of Lemma 1 seems obvious. If fundamental information is associated
with higher uncertainty, there is a stronger response to the financial report in the respective
market. Although this motivates additional reporting bias, market efficiency is effectively
improved. Our main analysis shows that this logic no longer applies if the manager faces
both types of incentives.
27 Note that in equilibrium improved capital market efficiency is associated with higher expected report-
ing bias, i.e., dE[b̃]/dσ2
k
> 0. This illustrates that measures of reporting bias are inappropriate to evaluate
the level of information asymmetry between management and the capital market: Reporting bias is ratio-
nally anticipated by the markets, which discount reports for expected bias levels (e.g., Narayanan, 1985;
Stein, 1989; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000).
28 Note that the uncertainty about the manager’s incentives is irrelevant for these results. The logic applies
even if her motives are publicly known.
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1.4 Main results
Equilibrium analysis
Corollary 2 summarizes characteristics of the reporting equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Characteristics of the equilibrium ERCs:
a) The capital market response to the financial report is always stronger than the labor
market response, βT = σ
2
θ · (σ2η + σ2θ)−1 · βP.
b) The ERCs in the capital and labor market are positive and bounded from above,
0 < βP < 1 and 0 < βT < σ
2
θ · (σ2η + σ2θ)−1.
The capital market price is more sensitive to the manager’s report than the talent assess-
ment. This results from the nested structure of firm value and managerial talent. The
financial report is a noisy signal of firm value, which is the sum of asset value and talent.
In contrast to the capital market, the labor market is only interested in the talent compo-
nent: Potential employers perceive the information on the firm’s asset value as additional
noise because this information is unrelated to managerial talent. Hence, financial reports
show a higher correlation with the total firm value than with managerial talent as one of
its components (Cov[θ̃, r̃] < Cov[ṽ, r̃]).
Note that in the presence of uncertain reporting objectives more reporting bias is asso-
ciated with additional noise. If earnings response increases, the markets rationally an-
ticipate that the manager adjusts her bias level. However, they do not know precisely
how much bias is added due to the uncertainty about the manager’s incentives x̃P and x̃T .
Formally, the uncertainty associated with the report increases in βP and βT :
Var[r̃] = Var[ṽ] + Var[b̃] = σ2v + σ
2
P · β2P + σ2T · β2T . (9)
This leads to our first main observation. With financial and reputational incentives, both
market reactions motivate bias and induce reporting noise. Note that the noise induced
by one of the markets represents an information externality for the other market: If the
capital market’s reaction dilutes the content of the report, the labor market learns less
and reduces its response accordingly. Vice versa, the noise induced by the labor market
represents an externality for the capital market and is considered by the firm’s investors.
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As a consequence, the equilibrium capital and labor market ERCs are reduced compared
to the benchmark cases with only one type of incentives.
Proposition 2 The capital and labor market ERCs are lower than in a reporting environ-
ment with only financial or reputational concerns, i.e., βP < β
B
P and βT < β
B
T .
Based on this result, we study comparative static results to gain further insights into the
interaction of financial incentives and reputational concerns. Lemma 2 summarizes the
effect of higher uncertainty about the manager’s financial and reputational motives.
Lemma 2 Both markets’ equilibrium ERCs as well as the expected equilibrium bias
are decreasing in uncertainty about the manager’s financial and reputational motives,
dβm/dσ
2
n < 0 and dE[b̃]/dσ
2
n < 0 for m, n ∈ {P,T }.
Higher uncertainty about the manager’s financial incentives or her reputational concerns
aggravates the noise in the report and attenuates the markets’ equilibrium reactions. As a
consequence, the manager faces lower-powered incentives to bias the report. This result is
standard in the literature (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000) and also holds in our model
with financial and reputational incentives.29
Next, we study the effect of higher uncertainty about firm value on the equilibrium results.
The results in this case are less obvious and require a detailed analysis. The equilibrium
ERCs according to Proposition 1 formalize the interdependency between financial incen-
tives and reputational concerns: The ERC βP in the capital market is a function of the
model parameters as well as the ERC βT in the labor market and vice versa.
Corollary 3 Increasing uncertainty σ2η and σ
2
θ about the value components has a direct


































︸      ︷︷      ︸
≡IT,k
for k ∈ {η, θ}. (10)
Dm,k and Im,k measure the direct and indirect effects of increasing σ
2
k
on βm, m ∈ {P,T }.
29 Although not explicitly stated, this result also prevails in the benchmark cases of section 1.3.
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Figure 1 Direct and indirect effects of higher uncertainty about firm value (k ∈ {η, θ})
Figure 1 illustrates the direct and indirect effects identified in Corollary 3. If the uncer-
tainty σ2
k
about the asset value (k = η) or managerial talent (k = θ) increases, this has
direct impact on both equilibrium ERCs according to (8). The direct effects reflect the
optimal earnings response in one market holding the other market’s response fixed.
The indirect effects are a consequence of the manager’s reaction to the direct effects.
Higher uncertainty about the firm value implies an adjustment of the markets’ ERCs βP
and βT . As illustrated in (9), the adjustment of the capital market ERC βP also affects the
reporting noise and thus creates an externality on the usefulness of the report in the labor
market. Vice versa, the direct effect on βT alters the investors’ ability to learn about firm
value. These externalities create the indirect effects formally defined in Corollary 3.
Following the argument above, the indirect effect Im,k of higher uncertainty about the
value component k ∈ {η, θ} on the ERC βm aggregates two effects formally given by the
derivatives dβm/dβn and dβn/dσ
2
k
. First, the other market’s ERC βn influences the report-
ing noise and thereby the equilibrium level of βm.
30 Second, the other market adjusts its
reaction to higher uncertainty about the value component. If managers are motivated ex-
clusively by financial incentives (xT = 0), the ERC in the capital market fully reflects the
direct effects, i.e., IP,η = IP,θ = 0. Analogously, if managers are motivated by reputational
concerns only (xP = 0), the reaction of the labor market is independent of the capital
market response, i.e., IT,η = IT,θ = 0.
30 This requires that the incentive weight related to the outcome of the other market is uncertain, σ2n > 0.
It is obvious from (8) that dβm/dβn ≤ 0. Equality only holds for σ2n = 0.
Chapter 1. Effects of Financial Incentives and Reputational Concerns on Reporting Bias 20
The effect of higher uncertainty about the asset value
This section provides a detailed analysis of the direct and indirect effects of increasing
uncertainty about the asset value. Lemma 3 establishes the signs of these effects.
Lemma 3 Direct and indirect effects of higher uncertainty about the asset value:
a) Higher uncertainty about the asset value σ2η has a positive direct effect on earnings
response in the capital market (DP,η > 0), but a negative direct effect on the labor
market reaction (DT,η < 0).
b) The indirect effects that are associated with an increase of the uncertainty about the
firm’s asset value σ2η amplify the direct effects, i.e., IP,η > 0 and IT,η < 0.
The asset value η̃ represents fundamental information for investors, but noise in the labor
market. Thus, higher uncertainty about this component provokes a positive direct effect in
the capital market: There is more to learn for investors who show greater responsiveness
to the report, i.e., DP,η > 0. At the same time, information about the manager’s talent is
diluted and the labor market’s reaction to the report is attenuated, i.e., DT,η < 0.
The indirect effects of σ2η amplify the direct effects. Increases in σ
2
η attenuate the labor
market’s earnings response and thus reduce the manager’s incentives to dissemble. The
noise in the financial report is reduced, which, in turn, enhances its usefulness for the
financial investors, IP,η > 0. Moreover, the positive direct effect in the capital market
motivates additional bias. According to (9), this dilutes information about managerial
talent and makes the report less useful for the labor market, IT,η < 0. The total effects are
unambiguous because direct and indirect effects are equally directed.
Proposition 3 If the uncertainty σ2η about the asset value increases, the capital market’s
earnings response βP increases while the labor market’s earnings response βT decreases.
Our results confirm the expectations raised in the benchmark analysis. The asset value
η is relevant information in the capital market. Hence, higher uncertainty σ2η makes the
financial report more valuable for investors of the firm. The corresponding ERC increases,
dβP/dσ
2
η > 0. At the same time, η is unrelated to the manager’s influence on firm value
and dilutes the talent information in the report. The labor market therefore reduces its
ERC in response to higher uncertainty about the asset value, dβT/dσ
2
η < 0. As the direct
and indirect effects have the same sign, there is no ambiguity in the market reactions.
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Figure 2 Effects of higher uncertainty about the asset value on market efficiency
(µP = µT = 40, σ
2
θ = 1.1, σ
2
P = 1)
Figure 2 illustrates our results. The three graphs depict the equilibrium ERCs for different
degrees of uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns, σ2T ∈ {1.6, 16, 49}. As
shown in Lemma 2, both earnings reactions are unambiguously decreasing in the variance
σ2T : The markets learn less about firm fundamentals if there is more uncertainty about
the manager’s motives. As a consequence, the manager’s incentives to dissemble are
attenuated. Confirming Proposition 3, the capital market ERC βP is increasing and the
labor market ERC βT is decreasing in higher uncertainty about the asset value.
The effect of higher uncertainty about talent value
In this section, we turn to the effects of higher uncertainty about the managerial talent.
Lemma 4 characterizes the direct and indirect effects of talent uncertainty.
Lemma 4 Direct and indirect effects of higher talent uncertainty:
a) Higher uncertainty σ2θ about managerial talent implies a positive direct effect on both
market reactions, i.e., DP,θ, DT,θ > 0.
b) The sign of the indirect effect of higher talent uncertainty σ2θ on the capital market
response is negative (IP,θ < 0). The indirect effect IT,θ on the labor market response is
ambiguous.
In contrast to the asset value, managerial talent θ represents fundamental information for
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capital and labor markets: The labor market is inherently interested in the manager’s
talent; financial investors learn about its contribution to firm value. Thus, increasing the
uncertainty about talent makes the financial report more valuable for both reporting users.
This is reflected in positive direct effects, DP,θ, DT,θ > 0.
Interestingly, the indirect effects of higher talent uncertainty can be opposed to the direct
effects. The positive direct effects on both markets’ ERCs provide additional incentives
for the manager to bias the report and thus introduce additional noise as illustrated in
equation (9). This creates a counterforce to the direct effects. The indirect effects subsume
these countervailing effects: While the indirect effect on the capital market response is
generally opposed to the direct effect (IP,θ < 0), the sign of the indirect effect IT,θ on the
labor market ERC is ambiguous. It can amplify or counteract the direct effect.
The reason for the asymmetry in the results is the nested structure of the fundamental
information in the market objectives. Financial investors assign a market price based on
both asset value and managerial talent; the labor market assesses only talent as a subset
of these components. In line with Corollary 2 a), this implies that the equilibrium ERC
in the labor market is always lower than the equilibrium ERC in the capital market. At
the same time, βT is more sensitive to changes in the variance σ
2
θ .
31 To formalize this





θ of the equilibrium ERCs. It is easy to see that
the marginal increase of the labor market ERC in talent uncertainty generally exceeds




θ . While the former is always
positive, the latter can take negative values. As a consequence, the capital market response
is strictly attenuated while the indirect effect on the labor market response is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 summarizes the total effects of higher talent uncertainty.
Proposition 4 The labor market’s earnings response βT increases in the uncertainty
about the manager’s talent σ2θ . The effect of talent uncertainty on the capital market’s
earnings response βP is ambiguous.
Managerial talent θ represents fundamental information in both markets. Following the
arguments of the benchmark analysis, higher talent uncertainty should therefore increase
the demand for information and enhance the usefulness of the report for both reporting
31 This is apparent from the implicit characterization in (8).
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users. Proposition 4 only partly confirms this intuition. Indeed, the labor market’s earn-
ings response increases in talent uncertainty. However, higher uncertainty about the man-
ager’s contribution to firm value can reduce earnings response in the capital market. The
reason for this observation is the interdependency between the markets’ ERCs resulting
from the manager’s incentives to dissemble. Proposition 5 provides a detailed analysis of
the ambiguous effects of talent uncertainty on the capital market ERC.
Proposition 5 The ambiguous effects of talent uncertainty on the capital market ERC:
a) If the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns is sufficiently high com-
pared to the uncertainty about her financial incentives (σ2T > 3 · σ2P), the capital
market’s earnings response is decreasing in intermediate values of talent uncertainty
σ2θ ∈ [ ¯
σ2θ , σ̄
2
θ] and increasing elsewhere.




θ] is widened as the uncertainty about the manager’s financial mo-
tives decreases or the uncertainty about her reputational concerns increases. It is




θ] ⊂ [0, 2 · σ2η].
Whether the capital market ERC is decreasing in the variance of talent depends on the
relative uncertainty about the manager’s financial and reputational motives. These results
reflect our previous observations. As the uncertainty about financial incentives decreases,
the externality of the financial investors’ reaction on the labor market ERC βT is atten-
uated. Thus, the labor market response provides high-powered incentives to bias the
financial report. This again introduces noise into the report, especially if there is high
uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns. The report becomes less useful
for investors. As a consequence, low values of σ2P and high values of σ
2
T characterize
settings, in which the capital market ERC is decreasing in talent uncertainty.
Our results are illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts the equilibrium ERCs as functions of
talent uncertainty σ2θ . The three differently shaded graphs visualize the effects of higher
uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns (σ2T ∈ {1.6, 16, 49}). Confirming
Lemma 2, increases in σ2T reduce both ERCs. As shown before, the uncertainty about
the manager’s reputational concerns does not only affect the level of the ERCs, but also
their slope. For low uncertainty about reputational motives (σ2T = 1.6), the capital market
earnings response βP is generally increasing in talent uncertainty. For σ
2
T = 16, the
capital market ERC is decreasing within the range σ2θ ∈ [0.03, 1.38]. If the uncertainty
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Figure 3 Effects of higher talent uncertainty on market efficiency
(µP = µT = 40, σ
2
η = 0.8, σ
2
P = 1)
about the managers reputational concerns increases to σ2T = 49, this range is widened to
[0.01, 1.53]. In line with Proposition 4, βT is increasing in talent uncertainty.
Expected reporting bias
We use our results to highlight implications for the expected bias level:
E[b̃] = E[b(η̃, θ̃, x̃P, x̃T )] = βP · µP + βT · µT . (11)












for k ∈ {η, θ}. (12)
We can therefore use the comparative static results of the previous sections to analyze
the effect of asset value and talent uncertainty on the expected bias level. We know from
Proposition 3 that the capital market ERC is increasing and the labor market ERC is
decreasing in the uncertainty about the asset value. Thus, it is unclear which of the two
effects dominates. Corollary 4 clarifies how the statistical properties of the manager’s
reputational incentives affect the slope of the expected bias level.
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Corollary 4 The expected reporting bias is decreasing in the uncertainty about the firm’s
asset value if
(i) the average benefits related to reputation are sufficiently high, i.e., µT >
¯
µT ,
(ii) markets have sufficient information about the reputational motives, i.e., σ2T < σ̄
2
T .
These results are intuitive. If the expected marginal benefits µT of increasing talent as-
sessment are sufficiently high, it is likely that the manager chooses her report primarily to
influence the labor market. The labor market’s ERC is decreasing in the uncertainty about
the asset value. Therefore, the expected bias is decreasing in σ2η if µT is high.
To understand the second part of the proposition, consider the case that the uncertainty
σ2T about the manager’s reputational concerns is high. Hence, any increase in the labor
market’s earnings response βT is associated with significant incremental reporting noise.
The labor market earnings response is therefore compressed: It takes low values and
is hardly sensitive to changes in σ2η. As a consequence, the adjustment of the capital
market ERC is leading the manager’s bias choice. Higher uncertainty about the asset value
implies higher expected reporting bias. Vice versa, the labor market’s earnings response
can only be dominant if there is low uncertainty about the manager’s reputational motives.
The results of the previous section show that more uncertainty about talent σ2θ generally
implies higher responsiveness in the labor market, but may reduce earnings response in
the capital market, i.e., dβP/dσ
2
θ < 0 and dβT/dσ
2
θ > 0. According to (12), this implies
countervailing effects on the manager’s bias choice: She increases the bias in response to
the labor market reaction, but reduces it considering the attenuated reaction by financial
investors. The total effect is ambiguous. Corollary 5 characterizes conditions for the
expected reporting bias to decrease in talent uncertainty.
Corollary 5 For σ2T > 3 · σ2P and σ2θ ∈ [ ¯
σ2θ , σ̄
2
θ], the expected bias level is decreasing in
the uncertainty about talent if and only if
(i) the average benefits related to reputation are low on average, i.e., µT < µ̄T ,
(ii) markets are sufficiently uncertain about the reputational motives, i.e., σ2T > ¯
σ2T .
According to Proposition 5, the capital market ERC decreases in talent uncertainty if the
markets are sufficiently uncertain about the manager’s reputational concerns (σ2T > 3·σ2P).
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the average benefits of reputation are low or (ii) markets have little information on the
manager’s reputational concerns. Low values of µT ensure that the manager primarily re-
acts to the capital market ERC βP, which is decreasing in σ
2
θ . Moreover, high uncertainty
about reputational concerns σ2T attenuates the labor market reaction. Thus, the manager’s
biasing decision is primarily led by the capital market response.
Note that the effects of higher uncertainty about the asset value and managerial talent
stand in stark contrast. Increasing variance σ2η reduces the expected bias if the manager’s
bias choice is led by the labor market reaction (i.e., for high µT and low σ
2
T ); increasing
variance σ2θ reduces the expected bias if the manager’s decision is primarily motivated by
the capital market (i.e., for low µT and high σ
2
T ).
To illustrate the results, we use the numerical examples introduced in the previous sec-
tions. The left-hand and right-hand sides of Figure 4 depict the expected reporting bias
as a function of σ2η and σ
2
θ respectively. E[b̃] is decreasing in σ
2
η for low uncertainty
about the manager’s reputational concerns (σ2T = 1.6) and increasing for high uncertainty
σ2T ∈ {16, 49}. In contrast, low uncertainty about reputational concerns (σ2T ∈ {1.6, 16})
ensures that the expected reporting bias is increasing in σ2θ . If the uncertainty about the
reputational motives is sufficiently high (σ2T = 49), the expected bias is decreasing within
the range σ2θ ∈ [0.06, 0.55]. Note that the expected bias even falls below its level without
any talent uncertainty. Talent uncertainty and the corresponding reputational incentives
can reduce reporting bias compared to a situation with observable managerial talent.
1.5 Should firms report on managers’ contributions to
firm value?
A prominent objective of financial reporting standards is the provision of decision-useful
information for investors of the firm (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001).32 For instance,
the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting states that reports should “pro-
vide financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions” (IASB, 2018: OB10). A cen-
32 Aside from the provision of decision-useful information, financial reporting standard setters pursue
other objectives such as stewardship (e.g., Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Due to the limited focus of our
model, we can only address standard setters’ intentions to provide value-relevant information.
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Figure 4 Effects of higher uncertainty about firm value on the expected reporting bias
(µP = µT = 40, σ
2
P = 1, σ
2
θ = 1.1, σ
2
η = 0.8)
tral criterion for information included in reports is relevance in the sense of IASB (2018:
QC6): It should be capable of changing users’ decisions to buy, sell or hold equity and
debt instruments. These objectives are closely related to the concepts of value relevance
and price efficiency as formally defined in our model. Information is useful if it has high
impact on the capital market price and reduces the investors’ uncertainty about the firm
value.
Information on the abilities of the firm’s management seem to be material in many cases
(see Johnson et al., 1985; Jenter, Matveyev, and Roth, 2016). Accordingly, the IASB
classifies such information as relevant and mandates the disclosure of information “about
how efficiently and effectively the reporting entity’s management has discharged its re-
sponsibilities to use the entity’s economic resources” (IASB, 2018: OB4). Moreover, the
value-relevance criterion must be applied independent of the usefulness of the informa-
tion for other stakeholders. The IASB acknowledges that there are other users of financial
reports. However, reports are not primarily directed to these parties (IASB, 2018: OB10).
This suggests that the reporting content should be tailored to the informational needs of
investors and creditors and neglect the presence of other reporting users such as labor
markets.
Such treatment disregards the interactions between reporting users identified in our study.
Including information that is relevant for the managerial labor market motivates addi-
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tional earnings management, which in turn dilutes information about the firm value. This
can cause a reduction of value relevance and price efficiency in the capital market. To
formalize our argument, consider a modified model setting, in which financial reporting
standard setters require the management only to report on asset value η and to exclude any
information about the talent component θ. While financial investors are still interested in
the firm value v = η + θ, the modified reporting objective alters the manager’s costs of
misreporting. In contrast to equation (2), the manager faces potential litigation costs if




· (r − η)2. (13)
The modified reporting objective has considerable implications for the equilibrium results
summarized by the following lemma.
Lemma 5 If the manager is supposed to report exclusively on the firm’s asset value, we
have the following unique linear equilibrium:34
r† = η + β†
P











If managerial talent is not part of the reporting objective, the equilibrium financial report
excludes any talent information. As a consequence, the report is irrelevant for the labor
market and not used to update the a priori beliefs about talent, β
†
T
= 0. The interdepen-
dency between the capital market and labor market ERCs is dissolved.
A comparison of value relevance β
†
P
and price efficiency Π
†
P
in the capital market with
the results of our main model highlights two differences. First, the financial report does
not reflect managerial talent. Note that talent represents fundamental information for in-
vestors. In line with the IASB’s argumentation, eliminating talent information therefore
reduces the usefulness of the report in the capital market. However, there is a coun-
tervailing effect. In the absence of the labor market’s earnings response, the manager’s
33 In this case, it is important that the manager has disaggregate information about the asset value and her
talent. This could be because she receives a report on firm value v by the firm’s internal accounting system
and has private information about her talent θ. We come to similar conclusions if the manager does not
precisely know the value of her talent but observes a noisy signal of the talent realization.
34 We use (·)† to denote the equilibrium coefficients under the modified reporting objective.
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incentives to misreport are attenuated. Therefore, the noise associated with the manager’s
bias choice is reduced. The latter effect allows better inferences on the firm’s asset value
and improves the usefulness of the report for financial investors. Proposition 6 identifies
conditions under which the elimination of talent information improves value relevance
and price efficiency in the capital market.35
Proposition 6 Eliminating the talent information from reporting objectives improves
(i) value relevance (i.e., β
†
P
> βP) if the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational
concerns is sufficiently high compared to her financial incentives (σ2T > 4 ·σ2P) and if
talent uncertainty takes intermediate values σ2θ ∈ [σ2L, σ2H].
(ii) price efficiency (i.e., Π
†
P
> ΠP) if the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational
concerns σ2T is sufficiently high and if talent uncertainty takes intermediate values
σ2θ ∈ [σ2l , σ2h] ⊂ [σ2L, σ2H].
The proposition highlights that it may be beneficial for value relevance and price effi-
ciency to remove information about managerial talent from financial reports. This is the
case if there is high uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns. Then, the
incentives provided by the labor market induce significant reporting noise. Regulations
that restrict the reporting content or leave firms discretion about the reported information
can help to alleviate this problem by making reports less useful for the labor market. This
stands in contrast to the IASB Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting, which
generally mandates to include (relevant) information on managerial contribution to firm
value.
Moreover, the IASB Conceptual Framework assesses the information needs of reporting
users aside from investors and creditors as largely irrelevant for the design of financial
reports. Our results indicate that the presence of other users, such as labor markets, can
critically influence the adequate choice of reporting standards. This is even the case if
standard setters focus exclusively on capital market efficiency. If users provide incentives
for managers to dissemble, this may cause additional reporting noise. As a consequence,
the usefulness of the report in the capital market may be reduced. Standard setters should
carefully consider potential detrimental effects of mandating the disclosure of information
which might be relevant for other reporting users.
35 In contrast to our main analysis, value relevance β
†
P
and price efficiency Π
†
P
are no longer identical if
talent information is removed from reports. This is why Proposition 6 addresses both measures separately.
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1.6 Extensions
Correlation of fundamentals
Empirical studies suggest a complementary relationship between the firm’s asset value
and managerial talent: Profitable firms with a large asset base are able to attract and retain
talented managers. To capture such relationship, the analysis in this section allows for
positive correlation ρ ∈ [0, 1] of asset value η̃ and managerial talent θ̃.36 We find that
























Note that the correlation does structurally not affect the capital market ERC according
to Proposition 1, but changes the form of the labor market ERC. To study the effect of













︸      ︷︷      ︸
≡IP,ρ
. (16)
The direct effect DP,ρ represents the change of βP implied by a marginal increase of ρ if
the labor market does not adjust its earnings response βT . We find that DP,ρ is strictly





σ2θ +2 ·ρ ·ση ·σθ. A higher variance σ2v raises financial investors’ demand for information
and implies higher earnings response, i.e., dβP/dρ > 0.
The indirect effect IP,ρ measures the adjustment of βP that is mediated by the labor mar-
ket earnings reaction βT (ρ). We find that this effect can be either positive or negative.
Although the direct effect is strictly positive, the total effect of increasing correlation
dβP/dρ = DP,ρ+ IP,ρ can be negative. Proposition 7 characterizes conditions which ensure
that earnings response in the capital market is decreasing in correlation.
36 If both components are perfectly correlated, learning about talent means learning about firm value.
37 We focus on the analysis of capital market efficiency.
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Proposition 7 The effects of correlated fundamentals:
a) If the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns is sufficiently high com-
pared to the uncertainty about her financial incentives (σ2T > 12 · σ2P) and talent
uncertainty is relatively small (σ2η > 5 ·σ2θ), the capital market’s earnings response is
decreasing within a non-empty interval of correlation levels [
¯
ρ, ρ̄] ⊂ [0, 1].
b) As uncertainty σ2T about reputational concerns increases, the interval [
¯
ρ, ρ̄] ap-




ρ = 0 and limσ2
T
→∞ ρ̄ = 1.
To provide intuition for these results, it is useful to consider the equilibrium labor market
response. According to equation (15), higher correlation ρ has two countervailing effects
on the equilibrium level of βT . First, it makes the report more informative for the labor
market, which is apparent from the numerator Cov[θ̃, r̃] = σ2θ + ρ · ση · σθ. The financial
report is a noisy signal about firm value and comprises both asset value and talent. If these
components are correlated, the asset value is not perceived as pure noise but conveys
information about managerial talent. Second, higher correlation increases the variance
of the firm value σ2v and therefore the uncertainty associated with the report, Var[r̃] =
σ2v + σ
2
P · β2P + σ2T · β2T . The report becomes less useful for the labor market.
It depends on the reporting environment whether the first or the second effect dominates.
If talent uncertainty is comparably high, increasing correlation does not have a significant
effect on the labor market’s ability to learn about talent. Correlation primarily increases
the uncertainty associated with the report. In this case, the denominator increases at a
faster rate than the numerator. If however talent uncertainty is sufficiently low, the labor
market hardly uses the report. In this case, even a small increase in correlation improves
the labor market’s learning about talent significantly.
Proposition 7 characterizes the latter case: If the labor market ERC βT increases in corre-
lation ρ, this provides additional incentives to bias the financial report. As a consequence,
the financial report is a noisier signal of firm value. This is particularly the case if there
is high uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns σ2T . For σ
2
η > 5 · σ2θ and
σ2T > 12 · σ2P, this effect is strong enough to make the capital market reduce its weight
on the financial report within a range of correlation levels [
¯
ρ, ρ̄]. This interval is widened
and finally approaches the full range of positive correlation if the uncertainty about the
manager’s reputational concerns is sufficiently high.
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Multiple users of financial reports
The previous analysis can be extended to more than two users of financial reports. In this
section, we use a generalized model to study how the number of the reporting users and
their objectives affect capital market efficiency. In contrast to our main analysis, assume
that the manager issues her report to the capital market (a = 0) and n additional risk-
neutral users (a = 1, ..., n). Addressee a ∈ A ≡ {0, ..., n} is interested in a specific subset
of assets of the firm, which contribute to firm value. For any subgroup of reporting users
M ∈ P(A), let ṽM denote the component of the firm value which constitutes fundamental
information for all users a ∈ M while it is irrelevant to any user a ∈ A/M.38 This defines
a disaggregation of firm value into disjoint components, ṽ ≡ ∑M∈P(A) ṽM. As in our main
analysis, we assume that each value component is normally distributed, ṽM ∼ N(0, σ2M).





Moreover, define S a ≡ {M ∈ P(A)| a ∈ M} the subgroups of reporting users which contain
user a ∈ A and ṽa ≡
∑
M∈S a ṽM his aggregate objective. It is reasonable to assume that the
capital market is interested in all aspects of firm value, i.e., ṽ0 = ṽ. After observing
the financial report, each user a ∈ A defines a price Pa reflecting the publicly available
information about his objective, Pa = E[ṽa|r]. The manager chooses her reporting bias b








The manager privately learns the realizations of the incentive weights xa. All reporting
users hold identical beliefs about their prior distribution: (x̃a)a∈A follow a multivariate nor-
mal distribution and are mutually independent with x̃a ∼ N(µa, σ2a). We define efficiency
measures analogously to our main analysis: The ERC βa measures how closely the price
Pa is linked to the financial report, βa ≡ dPa/dr.
38 P(·) denotes the power set of a given set, i.e., it is the set of all subsets.
39 Our main analysis constitutes a special case of this general setup. The asset value represents funda-
mental information only for financial investors while managerial talent is fundamental in both markets, i.e.,
ṽ = ṽ{P} + ṽ{P,T } with independent components ṽ{P} = η̃ and ṽ{P,T } = θ̃.
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where γ(sa) = Var[ṽs]/Var[ṽa] measures the relative uncertainty associated with the ob-
jectives of the reporting users s and a.
Note that the relative size of the equilibrium ERCs represents the relative uncertainty
about the users’ objectives, i.e., βs = γ
(sa) ·βa. To highlight implications for capital market
efficiency, we focus on the financial investors’ ERC β0.
Corollary 6 The capital market ERC β0 is decreasing if
(i) a reporting user a = n + 1 is added who is interested in part of the firm value, i.e.,
|S n+1| > 0, and provides (uncertain) incentives to bias the report, i.e., σ2n+1 > 0.
(ii) user a ∈ A/{0} is interested in a different objective with higher relative uncertainty.
We can conclude that increasing the number of reporting users or the uncertainty about the
users’ objectives generally reduces capital market efficiency. As illustrated in our main
analysis, the effect of higher uncertainty about firm value on the capital market ERCs






∣ γ(a0) < 2/3
}
(19)
denote the set of reporting users who are interested in ṽM and whose objective is associated
with relatively low uncertainty. More precisely, the definition requires that the uncertainty
about the objective of a user is smaller than two thirds of the aggregate uncertainty about
firm value. This helps us to characterize settings where higher uncertainty about firm
value reduces capital market efficiency.
Proposition 8 For M ∈ P(A), the capital market ERC β0 is decreasing in uncertainty
about the value component ṽM if AM is non-empty and the following condition holds:
∑
a∈AM
(−wa) · σ2a >
∑
a∈A/AM




(3 · γ(a0) − 2) · γ(a0) for a ∈ M
3 · γ(a0)2 for a < M
. (20)
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Proposition 8 naturally generalizes the results of our main analysis. Capital market effi-
ciency might decrease in the uncertainty about fundamental information ṽM. This is the
case if other reporting users exist who strive to learn about ṽM and whose objectives are




ensures that, first, increasing the variance σ2M does not only raise the information demand
of financial investors but also of other users and, second, that σ2M has a stronger effect on
these users’ ERCs than on the capital market ERC. Third, condition (20) requires that the
aggregate uncertainty (σ2a)a∈AM associated with the incentives provided by the competing
reporting users must be sufficiently high. Under these three conditions the indirect effects
of increasing the uncertainty σ2M dominate the direct effect. Although financial investors
have higher demand for information, the additional reporting bias induced by other re-
porting users significantly dilutes information on firm value. As a consequence, capital
market efficiency is reduced.
1.7 Conclusion
We study managers’ reporting bias in the presence of financial incentives and reputa-
tional concerns. Our analysis identifies interactions of both types of incentives assuming
that capital and labor markets are uncertain about managers’ reporting objectives: The
use of the financial report in one market motivates noisy bias and reduces the value of
the report in the other market. As a consequence, the presence of both financial incen-
tives and reputational concerns reduces financial and labor market efficiency compared to
settings where managers encounter only one type of incentives. Furthermore, our results
highlight the subtle role of fundamental uncertainty in real reporting environments with
multiple reporting users. When financial reports are processed by a single user, increasing
fundamental uncertainty creates additional demand for information and improves value
relevance and price efficiency (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000). Our results show that
this conclusion may not be valid if multiple stakeholders have a joint interest in a sub-
group of the firm’s assets and use financial reports to learn about these assets. In this case,
increasing fundamental uncertainty has countervailing effects. First, each reporting user
40 This observation is in line with the results of Proposition 5. The capital market ERC can only decrease
in σ2
θ
as far as σ2
θ
< 2 · σ2η, which is equivalent to σ2θ/σ2v < 2/3.
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assigns higher weight to the report, reacting to the additional demand for information.
Second, the additional attention provides incentives to bias the report, which increases
reporting noise. Considering managers’ financial and reputational incentives, we find that
higher uncertainty about managerial talent generally improves labor market efficiency, but
may decrease value relevance and price efficiency in the capital market. This is particu-
larly the case if markets are sufficiently uncertain about managers’ reputational motives
and if talent uncertainty is low compared to the overall fundamental uncertainty.
Our results have implications for standard setters’ intentions to provide relevant informa-
tion to investors and creditors. We characterize settings in which the value relevance of
financial reports can be improved by eliminating talent information – even if this informa-
tion is relevant to financial investors. What seems to be a contradiction can be explained
by the reporting noise associated with managers’ reputational concerns: Making reports
less meaningful for labor markets mitigates incentives to dissemble and may therefore
enhance investors’ insights into firm fundamentals. A practical example is the standard
setters’ choice between different measurement concepts for assets. For instance, standard
setters might require recording certain groups of assets at their value in use, which is
typically calculated as net present value of future cash flows generated in combination
with the firm’s given assets.41 Arguably, talented managers employ available assets in a
more efficient way, which results in higher value in use. The value in use measurement is
therefore informative about managerial talent. In contrast, fair value measurement does
conceptually not convey information about the influence of the firm’s management: Fair
values represent (market) prices which do not reflect potential complementarities with the
firm’s other assets.
On a more general level, our results show that capital market efficiency is not necessarily
improved if standard setters implement recognition and measurement rules that provide
a more accurate depiction of firm value. In this regard, our results show similarities to
existing work on relevance-reliability trade offs: A more precise depiction of firm value
in financial reports may be undesirable if the corresponding standards offer managers
additional discretion to bias reports. In line with this observation, we show that more
precise measures of firm value may increase reporting bias. However, reporting bias
in our setting does not result from increased leeway in accounting but from additional
41 IAS 36 requires firms to potentially report assets’ value in use when conducting impairment tests.
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reporting users, which are interested in the supplemental information and add incentives
to bias financial reports.
Following this logic, our analysis indicates risks of extending statutory reporting require-
ments. In an attempt to increase transparency and to provide a complete picture of firm
assets, standard setters such as the IASB mandate the disclosure of information that affects
investors’ and creditors’ decisions. However, if additional information is useful for vari-
ous stakeholders, a more complete depiction of firm value may create complex reporting
incentives, which aggravate the investors’ problem to understand and back out reporting
bias. This may be one reason for the mixed empirical evidence of value-relevance studies:
Although reporting requirements have been extended and refined over the past decades,
there is little evidence of improved value relevance of financial reports in capital markets
(e.g., Francis and Schipper, 1999; Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001; Gu, 2007). Ex-
isting literature discusses potential reasons such as the increasing relevance of intangible
assets. This analysis shows that additional reporting noise might have contributed to this
development: Financial reports have become a comprehensive instrument for managers
to communicate with the firms’ stakeholders. This creates implicit incentives to bias
reports. Recent empirical findings confirm the practical importance of reporting noise
(Beyer, Guttman, and Marinovic, 2018; Ferri, Zheng, and Zou, 2018). Our results could
thus be an interesting starting point for empirical work to study interactions in the capital
and labor markets’ use of financial reports.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We restrict our analysis to linear equilibria, i.e., the manager’s biasing strategy as well as
the market outcomes are linear functions of the available information:
b(v, xP, xT ) = λ + λη · η + λθ · θ + λP · xP + λT · xT , (21)
P(r) = αP + βP · r, T (r) = αT + βT · r. (22)
Given the linear strategies, the manager’s objective (4) becomes:
U = xP · (α̂P + β̂P · r) + xT · (α̂T + β̂T · r) −
1
2
· (r − v)2. (23)
The optimal bias level is given by:
r = v + β̂P · xP + β̂T · xT . (24)
A comparison with (21) shows:
λ = 0, λη = λθ = 1, λP = β̂P and λT = β̂T . (25)
Given linear beliefs about the manager’s reporting strategy, the market outcomes (3) to
the report are given by:
P =
λ̂η · σ2η + λ̂θ · σ2θ
λ̂2η · σ2η + λ̂2θ · σ2θ + λ̂2P · σ2P + λ̂2T · σ2T
· (r − (λ̂ + λ̂P · µP + λ̂T · µT )), (26)
T =
λ̂θ · σ2θ
λ̂2η · σ2η + λ̂2θ · σ2θ + λ̂2P · σ2P + λ̂2T · σ2T
· (r − (λ̂ + λ̂P · µP + λ̂T · µT )). (27)
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Comparing the equilibrium market strategies with (22) yields:
αP = −(λ̂ + λ̂P · µP + λ̂T · µT ) · βP, αT = −(λ̂ + λ̂P · µP + λ̂T · µT ) · βT , (28)
βP =






where Ω = λ̂2η · σ2η + λ̂2θ · σ2θ + λ̂2P · σ2P + λ̂2T · σ2T .
In equilibrium, the conjectures must be self-fulfilling. Substituting (25) into the above
coefficients yields:
































Thus, there is a one-to-one mapping between the capital market equilibrium ERC βP and
all other equilibrium coefficients. To show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium,




















· β3P + σ2v · (βP − 1) = 0. (34)
Note that the left-hand side of (34) is strictly increasing in βP. It becomes strictly negative
for βP = 0 and strictly positive for βP = 1. Continuity of the equilibrium condition
guarantees that (34) has a unique solution βP ∈ (0, 1). 
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Proof of Corollary 1
Consider the measures of price efficiency defined in (6). Assuming linear strategies ac-





(λη · σ2η + λθ · σ2θ)2




Var[θ̃] · Var[T̃ ]
=
λ2θ · σ2θ
λ2η · σ2η + λ2θ · σ2θ + λ2P · σ2P + λ2T · σ2T
. (36)
Substituting the equilibrium strategies according to Proposition 1 yields:











= βT . (37)

Proof of Lemma 1
The benchmark cases with either financial incentives or reputational concerns are special
cases of the general model for µP = σ
2
P = 0 and µT = σ
2
T = 0. The proof of Lemma 1
follows from our general analysis. 
Proof of Corollary 2
The relationship between βP and βT in a) has already been established in (32). Fur-
thermore, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium capital market ERC is





Proof of Proposition 2
The proof follows directly from Lemma 2. The equilibrium ERCs are independent of µP









the special cases for σ2T = 0 and σ
2
P = 0 respectively, the ERCs βP and βT in the general
model must take lower values, i.e., βBP > βP and β
B
T > βT . 
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Proof of Lemma 2
We use the implicit function theorem to show comparative static results with regard to σ2
k
,
k ∈ {P,T }. Using the result of Corollary 2 a), the equilibrium conditions for βP and βT












· β3P + σ2v · (βP − 1) = 0, (38)
FT (σ
2







· σ2P + σ2T
)
· β3T + σ2v · βT − σ2θ = 0. (39)
This reformulation of the equilibrium conditions dissolves the interdependency between
the equilibrium ERCs: FP characterizes βP without referring to βT ; analogously, FT de-















































































































Proof of Corollary 3
Based on the implicit equilibrium conditions according to Proposition 1, we interpret the
equilibrium ERC in one of the markets as a function of the model parameters and of the












)) with k ∈ {η, θ}.
Thus, varying the parameter value σ2
k
has a direct effect on each of the equilibrium ERCs
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︸      ︷︷      ︸
:=Im,k
for m, n ∈ {P,T }, m , n. (44)
The direct effect reflects the change in the ERC if the other market does not adjust its
earnings response. The indirect effect represents the change in the ERC as a result of the
other market’s adjustment. 
Proof of Lemma 3 and 4





k , βT ), βT ) ≡ σ2P · β3P + (σ2v + σ2T · β2T ) · βP − σ2v = 0, (45)
GT (σ
2
k , βP, βT (σ
2
k , βP)) ≡ σ2T · β3T + (σ2v + σ2P · β2P) · βT − σ2θ = 0. (46)
The direct effect of σ2
k
on the capital market ERC βP reflects the change in the capital
market ERC holding the labor market response βT constant (k ∈ {η, θ}). To analyze the



























σ2v + 3 · σ2P · β2P + σ2T · β2T
> 0. (48)
According to Corollary 2, βP is smaller than 1. As a consequence, the direct effects have
positive sign. Analogously, we evaluate the direct effects of σ2
k
on the labor market ERC
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2 · σ2T · βP · βT


















Moreover, we use the modified equilibrium conditions (38) and (39) to obtain the total

































































































































Furthermore, we can conclude that:
sgn(IT,θ) = (−1) · sgn(dβP/dσ2θ). (58)
This sign depends on the model parameters as the numerical examples in section 1.4
illustrate. Moreover, we use the characteristics of βP and βT established in Corollary 2 to






























































































Proof of Proposition 3 and 4
The effect of higher uncertainty about asset value and managerial talent on βP and βT has
already been established in the proof of Lemma 3 and 4. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Rearranging the equilibrium condition (38) yields:














σ2θ ≤ σ2θ ≤ σ̄2θ . (61)





θ are given by:
¯
σ2θ ≡





· σ2η, σ̄2θ ≡



















θ] of opposed market reactions only exists if σ
2
T − 3 ·σ2P > 0. It is easy to
see that under this condition the lower bound
¯
σ2θ is strictly positive. Moreover, increasing
the uncertainty about the manager’s reputational concerns widens this range while higher
































































































· σ2η · σ2P > 0. (64)
The signs of these expressions follow from the fact that σ2T − 3 · σ2P > 0 and thus:
2 −



















σ̄2θ = 2 · σ2η. (66)

Proof of Corollary 4
We have established in Proposition 3 that dβP/dσ
2
η > 0 and dβT/dσ
2
η < 0. Note that βP
and βT do not depend on the average incentive weights µP and µT . It is therefore obvious
that the derivative dE[b̃]/dσ2η according to equation (12) is negative for sufficiently high
values of µT that exceed a threshold value
¯
µT .
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To show the second part of the proposition, we rearrange the equilibrium conditions (38)
and (39) in the following way:
β3P =
σ6v · (1 − βP)
σ4v · σ2P + σ4θ · σ2T
, β3T =
σ4θ · (σ2θ − σ2v · βT )
σ4v · σ2P + σ4θ · σ2T
. (67)

















) · (σ2η + σ2θ)
· (1 − βP) · βP















) · (3 · σ2
θ
− 2 · (σ2η + σ2θ) · βT )
· βT . (69)









2 · σ4v · σ2P − (σ4v · σ2P − σ4θ · σ2T ) · βP

























2 · σ4v · σ2P − (σ4v · σ2P − σ4θ · σ2T ) · βP







Proposition 3 establishes dβP/dσ
2
η > 0. Therefore, higher uncertainty about the asset









2 · σ4v · σ2P − (σ4v · σ2P − σ4θ · σ2T ) · βP
(σ4v · σ2P + 3 · σ4θ · σ2T ) · (1 − βP)
> 1. (72)
To simplify this condition, we must distinguish two cases:
Case a) (µT · σ2θ − µP · σ2v) · σ4v · σ2P − (3 · µP · σ2v + µT · σ2θ) · σ4θ · σ2T > 0
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Solving condition (72) for βP yields:
βP < 1 +
µT · σ2θ · (σ4v · σ2P + σ4θ · σ2T )
(µT · σ2θ − µP · σ2v) · σ4v · σ2P − (3 · µP · σ2v + µT · σ2θ) · σ4θ · σ2T
. (73)
This is generally true because βP < 1 according to Corollary 2. Thus, in this case, the
expected bias level is generally decreasing in the uncertainty about the asset value.
Case b) (µT · σ2θ − µP · σ2v) · σ4v · σ2P − (3 · µP · σ2v + µT · σ2θ) · σ4θ · σ2T < 0
The condition that characterizes Case b) can be rearranged to:
σ2T >
(µT · σ2θ − µP · (σ2η + σ2θ)) · (σ2η + σ2θ)2 · σ2P
(µP · 3 · (σ2η + σ2θ) + µT · σ2θ) · σ4θ
. (74)
Thus, Case b) applies for sufficiently high values of σ2T . The condition (72) can now be
rearranged as follows:
βP > 1 −
µT · σ2θ · (σ4v · σ2P + σ4θ · σ2T )
(µP · σ2v − µT · σ2θ) · σ4v · σ2P + (3 · µP · σ2v + µT · σ2θ) · σ4θ · σ2T
︸                                                                           ︷︷                                                                           ︸
≡Hη
. (75)





2 · µT · (µP · σ2v + µT · σ2θ) · σ6θ · σ4v · σ2P
((µP · σ2v − µT · σ2θ) · σ4v · σ2P + (3 · µP · σ2v + µT · σ2θ) · σ4θ · σ2T )2
< 0. (76)
Thus, the right-hand side of (75) is strictly increasing in σ2T . The left-hand side of (75) is
strictly decreasing as shown in Lemma 2. As a consequence, condition (75) is fulfilled for
a larger set of parameters if σ2T decreases. Moreover, it is easy to see that limσ2T→∞ βP = 0
while limσ2
T
→∞(1 − Hη) > 0. This proves the existence of σ̄2T ≥ 0 such that the expected





Proof of Corollary 5
According to equation (12) the slope of the expected reporting bias in talent uncertainty





θ have negative sign. According to Proposition 4 we
Chapter 1. Effects of Financial Incentives and Reputational Concerns on Reporting Bias 47
have dβT/dσ
2
θ > 0. Any decrease of the expected reporting bias in talent uncertainty
therefore arises from a declining ERC in the capital market. We can therefore restrict our
analysis to the case dβP/dσ
2













If this condition holds, the derivative dE[b̃]/dσ2θ according to equation (12) is negative
for sufficiently low values of µT that fall below a threshold value µ̄T . This proves the first
part of the proposition.
As shown in Proposition 5, the condition (77) holds for a wider range of parameters if σ2T





σ4v · σ2P − (2 · σ2η − σ2θ) · σ2θ · σ2T
(σ4v · σ2P + σ4θ · σ2T ) · σ2v
· (1 − βP) · βP










(σ4v · σ2P + σ4θ · σ2T ) · (3 · σ2θ − 2 · σ2v · βT )
· βT . (79)
Thus, dβP/dσ
2
θ < 0 requires that:
σ4v · σ2P − (2 · σ2η − σ2θ) · σ2θ · σ2T < 0. (80)
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It is easy to verify that dHθ/dσ
2
T < 0. At the same time, βP is strictly decreasing in σ
2
T (see
Lemma 2). Thus, the expected reporting bias is decreasing for a larger set of parameters
if σ2T increases or µT decreases. 
Proof of Lemma 5
Following the procedure of Proposition 1 with the modified cost function (2), we establish
the equilibrium conditions stated in the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 6
A comparison of the capital market ERCs according to Proposition 1 and Lemma 5 shows
that the ERC with modified reporting objective corresponds to the ERC in our main model





=0. It is therefore
sufficient to study under which conditions the capital market ERC βP in our main model
falls below its level without talent uncertainty, βP < βP|σ2
θ
=0.
For this purpose, it is useful to refer to the explicit solution of βP. Applying Cardano’s
















































. It is easy to see, that βP is increasing in A. We therefore have:
βP < βP|σ2
θ
=0 ⇔ A < A|σ2θ=0 ⇔ σ
2
L ≤ σ2θ ≤ σ2H (85)







































. This proves the
































v ≤ 1, this condition cannot be satisfied for σ2θ ≤ σ2L or σ2θ ≥ σ2H. Proposition 5
shows that βP has a local minimum in σ̄
2




















θ = 2 · σ2η and thus limσ2T→∞ A|σ2θ=σ̄2η = 0. As







βP = 0. (89)
















=0 > 0. (90)





=0 is independent of σ
2
T and A|σ2θ=0 > 0. As a consequence,




T is large enough. Due to continuity, this is true




] ⊂ [σ2L, σ2H] of σ̄2θ . 
Proof of Proposition 7
Following the procedure used in the proof of Proposition 1, we establish the equilibrium
ERCs according to equation (15). Using these implicit characterizations, we use Car-
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θ + 2 · ρ · ση · σθ)3
σ2
P
· (σ2η + σ2θ + 2 · ρ · ση · σθ)2 + (σ2θ + ρ · ση · σθ)2 · σ2T
.
It is easy to see that βP is strictly increasing in A. Moreover:
dA
dρ













, ρ̄ = ᾱ · ση
σθ









































A prerequisite for the existence of the interval [
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· σ2P > 0. (94)
As a consequence,
¯

























σ2η − 5 · σ2θ
4 · ση · σθ
. (95)







1, which completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 6
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Corollary 6








 · β30 + σ2v · (β0 − 1) = 0. (96)
Note that F0 is increasing in β0. Its slope depends on the sum
∑
s∈A γ
(s0)2 · σ2s . Raising the





(s0)2 ·σ2s takes higher values if a reporting user a ∈ A/{0} changes his objective such
that the new objective is associated with higher (relative) uncertainty, γ(a0) = Var[ṽa]/σ
2
v .
In both cases, equation (96) is satisfied by a lower level of β0. 
Proof of Proposition 8
We use the implicit function theorem to show comparative static results of β0 with regard













3 · γ(a0)2 · σ2a +
∑
a∈M







· (1 − β0) · β0
3 − 2 · β0
.(97)












3 · γ(a0)2 · σ2a +
∑
a∈M
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This sign can only be negative if γ(a0) < 2/3 for at least one a ∈ M, i.e., AM , ∅. Then,
the expression on the right-hand side becomes negative if and only if:
∑
a∈AM
−(3 · γ(a0) − 2) · γ(a0) · σ2a >
∑
a∈A/M
3 · γ(a0)2 · σ2a +
∑
a∈M/AM
(3 · γ(a0) − 2) · γ(a0) · σ2a. (99)






I study an M&A transaction where a target firm is sold to a buyer. In a two-stage reporting
game, the target manager reports firm value to the intermediary hired by the seller. The
intermediary tries to undo the manager’s bias and reports firm value to the buyer, thereby
biasing its own report. The success fee paid to the intermediary is of particular interest
to my analysis and affects the biasing incentives of the manager and the intermediary.
I find that value relevance is always maximized for a success fee of zero. In this case,
the intermediary reports his best estimate of firm value. Price efficiency, however, can
be increasing or decreasing in success fee, depending on the relative uncertainty about
biasing incentives of the manager and the intermediary. If there is uncertainty about
both players’ incentives, price efficiency is always maximized for an interior solution of
success fee between zero and one.
Keywords: reporting bias, mergers and acquisitions, value relevance, price efficiency
∗ This thesis chapter is based on the unpublished working paper:
Feller, Miró (2019). “Reporting Bias in Mergers & Acquisitions”, University of Zurich.
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2.1 Introduction
There is vast evidence for earnings management and overpriced transactions in M&A,
indicating low levels of price efficiency. For example, in December 1997, CUC Interna-
tional, Inc. and HFS, Inc. merged to Cendant. The merger became one of the largest ac-
counting scandal at the time due to fraudulent earnings management activities by CUC. In
the three years preceding the transaction, the company overstated earnings, thereby fool-
ing auditors and the management of HFS. The fraud was only detected after the merger
had been completed (Morgenson, 2004).
In the course of M&A, it is often the case that the transaction price is considered to be
too high. When Microsoft Corporation paid USD 26.2 billion (or USD 196 per share)
in an all-cash deal for the acquisition of LinkedIn, Inc. in 2016, it was considered a
massive overpayment. Although Microsoft claimed that “the deal has massive synergies
that will justify the purchase price” (Trainer, 2016), Morningstar, Inc. analysts valued
LinkedIn at USD 155 per share, estimating an overpayment of more than 26 percent
(Morningstar, 2016).
I aim to shed new theoretical light on the evidence. It is generally unclear what the rea-
sons for low price efficiency and overpayment in M&A are. To this end, I study the
consequences of misreporting incentives on reporting bias, value relevance and price ef-
ficiency where, in contrast to the existing literature, two parties can engage in earnings
management. I analyze an M&A transaction where a seller represented by the manager
sells his firm to a buyer, thereby hiring an intermediary such as an investment bank or con-
sulting firm to conduct the transaction. In a two-stage reporting game, the target manager
reports firm value to the intermediary who reports firm value to the buyer. The seller pays
a success fee to the intermediary that is of particular interest to my analysis and affects
biasing incentives of both, the manager and the intermediary.
I find that the buyer’s reaction coefficient on the intermediary report as an indicator for
value relevance is always maximized if the success fee arranged between the seller and
the intermediary is zero. Because the intermediary has no incentive to bias the report in
this case, he reports his best estimate of firm value to the buyer while trying to remove
the manager’s bias. However, that does not hold for price efficiency. If there is uncer-
tainty about incentives of both, manager and intermediary, a small and positive success
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fee always increases price efficiency compared to a fee arrangement with zero success
fee. Moreover, price efficiency for a success fee slightly below one is always higher than
for a corner point success fee equal to one. This finding indicates that there always exists
an interior solution of success fee between zero and one that maximizes price efficiency.
Furthermore, my model shows that a higher synergy importance always implies a higher
value relevance (and price efficiency), predicting that a buyer with higher interest in syn-
ergies would place more weight on the intermediary report when pricing the firm.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. It adds new insights to the research in M&A
and the literature on earnings management. Thus far, earnings management in an M&A
context has not been studied from a theoretical point of view. This paper addresses the
gap between empirical evidence for earnings management in M&A transactions and the
missing theoretical basis.
So far, no one has studied the joint possibility of manipulation by both, the firm seller and
intermediary in the context of an M&A transaction as I do in this paper. However, there
exist theoretical papers on M&A which are specified below.
In their model, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) provide a theoretical intuition for earnings ma-
nipulation in M&A, especially for overvaluation purposes of buyer equity in the context
of stock for stock deals. Similarly, Fischer and Louis (2008) study managers’ financial
reporting behavior prior to management buyouts (MBOs). They argue that managers not
only have an incentive to manage earnings downward to reduce the purchase price in the
context of MBOs, but also an incentive for upward earnings management in order to re-
duce financing costs when they use external funds for the acquisition.
French and McCormick (1984) explain in their sealed-bid auction study that “the owner
has an incentive to provide optimistic information about the value of the asset”, providing
a rationale for target earnings management. Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) ar-
gue that, besides uncertainty about firm value, managerial overconfidence and following
Jensen and Meckling (1976), private benefits from acquisitions are two additional rea-
sons for overpayment in M&A. Gärtner and Schmutzler (2009) study a merger of two
privately informed parties. In a mechanism-design model, they analyze the effects of the
parties’ information endowment about stand-alone values and merger profits and describe
conditions for efficient merger decisions. However, they restrict their analysis on truthful
reporting, i.e., any kind of misreporting is ignored.
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This paper also adds to the analytical earnings management literature. The model of Stein
(1989) assumes that the managerial incentives are known such that earnings management
activities of can be backed out perfectly. Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) show that if there
is uncertainty about the incentives of the manager, the capital market backs out the report-
ing bias only in expectation. In this setting, the manager can benefit from misreporting
earnings. Dye and Sridhar (2004) study relevance and reliability trade offs in accounting
reports under the assumption that accounting reports aggregate precise, but potentially
biased managerial information and unmanipulable, but imprecise information on a firm’s
cash flow. The former type of information is more relevant due to its precision but less
reliable because of the manager’s bias. In contrast to Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), they
introduce reporting noise by assuming uncertainty about managers’ costs of misreporting
which leads to similar results. In their reporting game, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005)
study the tightness of accounting standards when managers can engage in both, account-
ing and real earnings management. Accounting quality is increased by tighter standards
through lower accounting earnings management while real earnings management is in-
creasing. It can be the case that the total reporting bias is higher compared to the situation
with looser standards. Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) analyze a two-stage reporting
model where a manager reports earnings to an auditor who tries to back out the manage-
rial bias, but then adds an own bias and reports biased earnings to the public. They find
that total reporting bias can be increasing in managers’ costs of misreporting.
Compared to theoretical research in M&A, there is vast empirical literature, especially
studies of earnings management in M&A transactions.
Easterwood (1998) find that target managers systematically increase reported earnings in
the quarters preceding the takeover. Chang and Lim (2017) find that the financial report-
ing quality of target firms is lower than that of non-target firms due to earnings manage-
ment activities prior to M&A. Campa and Hajbaba (2016) find evidence for real earnings
management among targets of cash acquisitions and subsequent underperformance of the
target firm due to the reversal of real earnings management. In similar contexts, Teoh,
Welch, and Wong (1998b) who study initial public offerings as well as Teoh, Welch, and
Wong (1998a) and Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2016) analyzing seasoned equity
offerings find evidence for earnings management to increase transaction price. However,
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2013) find that targets seeking a buyer manage earnings
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downward and discuss a lower acquisition price increasing deal probability as a potential
explanation for such behavior. In stock for stock mergers, acquiring firms manipulate their
accounting reports by overstating their earnings before the merger announcements to in-
crease the stock price in order to reduce the acquiring costs (see Erickson and Wang, 1999;
Louis, 2004; Botsari and Meeks, 2008). Bens, Goodman, and Neamtiu (2012) find that
buyer firms facing performance pressure after deal completion to justify the transaction
engage in earnings management. Many papers find evidence for overpayments in M&A,
often measured by value destruction through a decreasing share price of the buyer in the
aftermath of the transaction (Wruck, 2001; John, Liu, and Taffler, 2010; Díaz, Azofra,
and Gutiérrez, 2013).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2.2, I present the model
setup. The equilibrium properties are derived in Section 2.3 and benchmark cases are
analyzed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides the main results of the paper, in particular
the consequences of biasing incentives on value relevance and price efficiency. Section
2.6 summarizes the findings in this paper and concludes.
2.2 Model setup
I consider a typical M&A transaction where a target firm is sold by a seller (the owner of
the firm) to a buyer. The seller is represented by a target manager who hires an intermedi-
ary to conduct the sale of the target firm. The intermediary could be an investment bank
or an M&A consulting firm.
The total firm value ṽ from the buyer’s perspective is the weighted sum of two normally
distributed random components:
ṽ = η̃ + γ · s̃. (1)
The first component η̃ ∼ N(0, σ2η) represents the stand-alone firm value of the target
firm. I refer to this component as the asset value of the target. The second component
s̃ ∼ N(0, σ2s) is the synergy value that is realized during the transaction. The parameter
γ > 0 indicates the relative importance of the synergy value to the buyer. All players
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share common prior beliefs about the distribution of the two firm value components.1 I
further assume that the asset value and the synergy value are stochastically independent
and uncorrelated which implies that the covariance of η̃ and s̃ is zero.2 Thus, the firm





2 · σ2s .
As in a single-firm, single-period reporting game, the manager reports total firm value
after observing a private signal of the stand-alone target value to the intermediary. How-
ever, unlike the standard reporting game, there are two reports in my model. That is, in
addition to the manager’s report, the intermediary observes a private signal of the synergy
value, updates his belief about the true firm value and reports to the buyer. The buyer sets
the final transaction price by using the report of the intermediary.3
Before issuing her report to the intermediary, the manager privately observes the firm’s ac-
counting earnings e as an imprecise measure of the asset value η̃ with noise ε̃e ∼ N(0, σ2e):
ẽ = η̃ + ε̃e. (2)
The true earnings can be understood as internal information which are not publicly ob-
servable, for example derived from a managerial accounting system. The manager updates
her belief about the total firm value by using the private earnings signal and the prior belief
about the synergy value. She then adds a bias and issues the report rm to the intermediary.
The manager’s report is not observed by the buyer. At the same time, the intermediary
observes a private signal of the synergy value s̃ which contains a noise ε̃z ∼ N(0, σ2z ):
z̃ = s̃ + ε̃z. (3)
The intermediary’s signal arises from market research, industry knowledge and experi-
ence from past transactions.4 The variance of the measurement error σ2z can be inter-
preted as an indication of the intermediary’s quality. After observing the manager’s report
1 Without qualitatively changing the results, the expected asset value and the expected synergy value are
set to zero.
2 I acknowledge that the acquisition of larger firms might result in positive synergy values, e.g., in the
form of market entries (positive correlation) or in negative synergy values, e.g., more complex integration
of the target administration (negative correlation). However, allowing for a non-zero correlation does not
qualitatively change the results of this paper.
3 I assume that the transaction takes place for sure and that only the transaction price must be determined.
4 The intermediary’s signal is assumed to be exogenously given.
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rm and the synergy signal z, the intermediary updates his estimation of the total firm value
considering his conjectures about the manager’s bias. Finally, the intermediary reports ri,
including the intermediary’s own bias, to the buyer.
In choosing their optimal bias levels, the manager and the intermediary aim to maximize
their expected utility. As usual in M&A transactions, the intermediary’s proceeds contain
a fixed retainer fee to cover the costs and a success fee depending on the transaction price
P. For simplicity and without changing the results, the retainer fee is normalized to zero.
The success fee is defined as a share δ ∈ [0, 1] of the target firm’s price. The magnitude
of this share represents the relative bargaining power of the intermediary to the target firm
who retains a share of 1− δ of the transaction price. I assume that these shares are exoge-
nously given and fixed before the parties enter the transaction.5
The expected utility of the manager is given by:
E[Um] = xm · (1 − δ) · E[P̂|e] −
1
2
· E[(ṽ − rm)2|e]. (4)
The manager’s utility depends on the seller’s share of the transaction volume after deduct-
ing the intermediary’s success fee. The incentive weight of the manager xm represents
her given explicit (monetary) and implicit (reputational) interest in a high transaction
price. Besides the manager’s current equity stake held in form of restricted shares and
options, the manager’s incentives can arise also from different forms of side payments to
the target manager, e.g., golden parachutes in form of stock options, unscheduled stock
options during M&A negotiations or retention agreements such as golden handcuffs. The
purpose of the incentive systems is to counter managerial resistance during the takeover
process and to attain the highest possible price (see Berkovitch and Israel, 1996; Fluck
and Lynch, 1999; Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004; Broughman, 2017). Furthermore,
the manager can be interested in a high transaction price through reputational incentives
of being associated with a valuable and prestigious firm Srinivasan (2005). Following
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), I assume here the manager’s incentive rate is a normally
distributed random variable with x̃m ∼ N(µm, σ2m) from the perspective of third parties and
5 This is the standard procedure in practice. Before an M&A project begins, negotiations take place
between the seller and the intermediary regarding the contractual terms of the sale mandate where the fee
arrangement is defined. More generally, the players’ shares in the transaction price can be thought of as
the solution of a generalized Nash bargaining game (see Nash Jr., 1950). Modeling this game is beyond the
scope of this study.
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privately observed by the manager before issuing her report to the intermediary.
On the other hand, the intermediary’s expected utility function takes the form:
E[Ui] = xi · δ · E[P̂|rm, z] −
1
2
· E[(ṽ − ri)2|rm, z]. (5)
Similar to the manager, the intermediary is also interested in the magnitude of the trans-
action price. The higher the transaction price, the higher is the success fee paid to the
intermediary. In the following analysis, the intermediary is represented by a single in-
vestment banker or consultant. So that the incentive rate xi of the intermediary can be
thought of as a bonus rate (monetary incentive) or a gain in reputation for working on a
large project in terms of deal size (Knee, 2006). Similarly as for the manager, I assume
the intermediary’s incentive rate to be normally distributed with x̃i ∼ N(µi, σ2i ).
It is important to understand that the misreporting in this model takes the form of account-
ing earnings management or window dressing without bearing any real consequences for
the firm value. Earnings management in this sense involves the selection of accounting
procedures in line with generally accepted accounting principles. Real earnings manage-
ment would have an impact on the firm value and thus a single-period analysis would
not be sufficient to study such a setting.6 As common in the earnings management lit-
erature, I assume a quadratic cost function for both, the manager and the intermediary,
each function calibrated with one half (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Dye and Srid-
har, 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005; Guttman, Kadan, and Kandel, 2006; Feller and
Schäfer, 2019). I follow Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) in assuming that the misre-
porting costs are proportional to the difference between the expected firm value and the
respective report conditional on the information observed by the respective player.
The buyer only observes the intermediary’s report about the total firm value. Thus, the
price P is defined as the expected firm value conditional on the intermediary’s report ri:
P = E [ṽ|ri] . (6)
The timeline of my model unfolds as follows. First, the manager and the intermediary
privately observe their incentive rates xm and xi as well as the realizations of the earnings
signal e (only the manager) and the synergy signal z (only the intermediary). Then the
6 For an example of a model with real earnings management see Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005).
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manager issues the earnings report rm to the intermediary.
7 After observing the report rm,
the intermediary provides the report ri to the buyer. Finally, the buyer sets the transaction
price based on the intermediary’s report. The manager and the intermediary receive their
respective utilities. The timeline of the model is summarized in Figure 1.
2.3 Equilibrium
I analyze a linear rational expectations equilibrium where the manager’s and the inter-





+ λ0 + λe · e + λx · xm
︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
manager’s reporting bias
, (7)
ri = E[ṽ|rm, z]
︸     ︷︷     ︸
firm value belief
+ ω0 + ωr · rm + ωz · z + ωx · xi
︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
intermediary’s reporting bias
, (8)
P(ri) = α + β · ri. (9)
7 The buyer does not observe the earnings report.
8 I follow Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi (2010) by integrating their conditional expectations of the firm
value in the players’ conjectures.
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The manager updates her belief about total firm value after observing her private signal of
the asset value and adds her bias based on the private information e and xm when reporting
rm to the intermediary. The intermediary then updates his belief of the total firm value
after observing the manager’s report rm as well as his private signal of the synergy value
z, anticipating the manager’s bias. Then the intermediary adds his own bias to the report
ri which is addressed to the buyer, depending on his information set rm, z and xi. Finally,
the buyer sets the price after observing ri where β is the weight put on the intermediary’s
report when pricing the firm. Lemma 1 summarizes the equilibrium of the model.
Lemma 1 In the reporting game, there is a unique linear equilibrium that takes the form:




ω0 = ωr = ωz = 0 and ωx = δ · β, (11)
α = −δ · µi · β2 and β =
Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]]
Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]] + ω2x · σ2i
. (12)
I refer to λx, ωx and β as reaction coefficients since those coefficients directly affect the
players’ optimal strategies. Further, λx and ωx are interpreted as biasing coefficients of








These coefficients are an indicator of the manager’s and the intermediary’s marginal in-
centives to bias their respective reports for a given change in the realization of their un-
known preference parameter. Therefore, λx and ωx measure the magnitude of the seller’s
and the buyer’s reporting biases, respectively: The higher λx and ωx, ceteris paribus, the
higher is the individual reporting bias for a given realization of xm and xi, respectively.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium reaction coefficients take values from the following bounded
intervals:
a) The reaction coefficient of the manager’s reporting function with regard to the mag-
nitude of her private incentive rate xm is bounded as follows: λx ∈ (0, (1 − δ) · β).
b) The reaction coefficient of the intermediary’s reporting function with regard to the
magnitude of his private incentive rate xi is bounded as follows: ωx ∈ (0, δ · β).
Chapter 2. Reporting Bias in Mergers & Acquisitions 63
c) The buyer’s reaction coefficient with regard to the intermediary’s report ri is bounded
as follows: β ∈ (0, 1).
It is important to note that these coefficient boundaries only hold for non-benchmark
cases, i.e., when δ ∈ (0, 1).
As usual in the class of reporting games considered in this paper, the players’ biases do
not depend on their own signal realizations, i.e., λe = 0 and ωr = ωz = 0. However, the
manager and the intermediary use their signals to update their belief about true total firm
value.
For the purpose of analyzing the equilibrium properties in the sense of market efficiency,
two different measures are used: value relevance and price efficiency. In most one-stage
reporting games (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia (2000); Feller and Schäfer (2019)), the two
measures coincide. However, this relationship does not hold in two-stage reporting games
and therefore requires a careful analysis.
The value relevance describes the association between the intermediary’s report ri and the
final takeover offer P, i.e., how much the buyer relies on the provided information when
pricing the firm. Consequently, the buyer’s reaction coefficient β represents the value








The second measure, price efficiency, sheds light on how much information about the
true firm value is contained in the transaction price P, i.e., to what degree the initial
buyer’s uncertainty about the firm value is reduced. The price efficiency PE is defined
as the relative portion of prior firm value variance that is eliminated by the information
contained in the transaction price:
PE =
Var [ṽ] − Var [ṽ|P]
Var [ṽ]
= β · Cov [ṽ, r̃i]
Var [ṽ]
, where PE ∈ [0, 1]. (15)
If the transaction price is perfectly revealing the firm value, i.e., Var [ṽ|P] = 0, price effi-
ciency is maximized (PE = 1) and the buyer pays the true firm value. On the other hand,
if the price is not informative at all, i.e., Var [ṽ|P] = Var [ṽ], price efficiency is lowest
(PE = 0) and nothing about the true firm value is learned by the transaction price. In
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most financial reporting studies, the manager reports earnings to the stock market which
in turn sets the share price. Price efficiency shows how much information about the fun-
damental firm value is captured in the share price, i.e., the extent to which the market
correctly prices the firm. In this paper, price efficiency is an indicator of whether a correct
transaction price is paid.
2.4 Benchmark analysis
In this subsection, I analyze two benchmark cases. First, I study the results of the model in
the case where the success fee δ is fixed at zero, the lower benchmark. Second, I consider
the case in which δ is equal to one, the upper benchmark.
Lower benchmark: zero success fee
A success fee of zero means that the intermediary’s proceeds only consist of a fixed re-
tainer fee9 and do not depend on the transaction price. With this reward structure, the
seller receives the entire transaction price. The equilibrium properties of the benchmark
case follow directly from Lemma 1 and are presented in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 The following unique equilibrium properties exist in the benchmark case
with zero success fee:




ω0 = ωr = ωz = ωx = 0, (17)
α = 0 and β = 1. (18)
Compared to the equilibrium reaction coefficients in Lemma 1, the manager’s biasing
coefficient λx and the buyer’s pricing coefficient β reach their maximum values in the
benchmark case. On the other hand, the biasing coefficient of the intermediary, ωx, is
equal to zero and thus strictly lower than in the case with a positive success fee rate δ.
9 As described before, the retainer fee is normalized to zero in this paper.
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In the lower benchmark, the manager’s bias is strictly higher than in a case with a positive
success fee where a lower portion of the transaction proceeds is assigned to the seller.
While the manager has maximum incentive to bias, the intermediary has no incentive to
misreport the firm value to the buyer because his payoff does not depend on the price
offered by the buyer. Consider the intermediary’s utility function (5). With a success fee
of zero, i.e., δ = 0, the intermediary maximizes his utility by minimizing the difference
between his report and the updated belief about firm value. As a result, the intermediary
reports his best possible estimation of total firm value given his private information and
considering the information contained in the manager’s biased earnings report. In min-
imizing the personal costs of misreporting, the intermediary acts exactly in the buyer’s
interest, i.e., there is no conflict of interest. Compared to the buyer, the intermediary has
more precise information about the firm value after observing rm
10 and z. Therefore, the
buyer relies entirely on the intermediary’s report when pricing the firm: β equals one and
value relevance is maximized. Consequently, α, the correction for the managerial bias, is
zero.
Furthermore, the manager’s biasing incentive λx reaches its maximum magnitude, ceteris
paribus, for a success fee δ of zero. The findings regarding biasing incentives and value
relevance are described in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 The manager’s biasing incentive and value relevance are maximized in the
benchmark case of a zero success fee while the intermediary has no incentive to bias and
reports his best estimate of the firm value.
Upper benchmark: maximum success fee
In the opposite extreme compared to the lower benchmark analyzed before, the intermedi-
ary has the entire bargaining power. Thus, the intermediary receives the total transaction
price since δ is equal to one in this case. The equilibrium properties follow from Lemma
1 and are presented in Corollary 4.
10 It is important to note that the manager’s report rm is not observed by the buyer.
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Corollary 4 The following unique equilibrium properties exist in the upper benchmark
with a success fee of one:
λ0 = λe = λx = 0, (19)
ω0 = ωr = ωz = 0 and ωx = β, (20)
α = −µi · β2 and β =
Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]]
Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]] + β2 · σ2i
. (21)
The resulting biasing coefficients show that the manager has no incentive to manipulate
the earnings report in the benchmark case of maximum success fee. The intuition is the
same as above: Because the manager’s payoff does not depend on the transaction price
P, she would only suffer misreporting costs without benefiting from a higher price. On
the other hand, the intermediary’s incentive to bias, ωx, is strictly higher than in the lower
benchmark case. Furthermore, α is non-zero. The intuition is straightforward: The buyer
knows that the intermediary biases the report and thus corrects for the expected bias when
setting the transaction price. Compared to the lower benchmark, value relevance is strictly
lower in the case of δ = 1. The findings regarding biasing incentives and value relevance
are described in Corollary 5.
Corollary 5 The intermediary’s biasing incentive is maximized in the benchmark case
of maximum success fee. The value relevance for δ = 1 is strictly lower than the value












This section studies selected comparative statics of the model and sheds light on value
relevance and price efficiency in M&A transactions for arbitrary success fees between
zero and one.
Comparative statics and value relevance
Corollary 6 summarizes comparative statics of the reaction coefficient β and the biasing
coefficients λx and ωx with respect to success fee δ and synergy importance γ.
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Corollary 6 Comparative statics:





















As described in Corollary 6, the manager’s incentive to bias is decreasing in the success
fee, i.e., the lower the seller’s share of the transaction price, the less the manager is willing
to bias the report to influence the price. In contrast, the intermediary’s incentive to bias
his report is increasing in δ. The higher the intermediary’s share of the transaction price,
the more he benefits from a higher price and thus tries to increase it by manipulating his
report. Figure 2 shows the relation of an increasing success fee δ within the defined range
of [0, 1] and the biasing incentives of the manager, λx, and the intermediary, ωx.
I study next the relation between the success fee and value relevance. As outlined in
Corollary 6, the effect of the success fee δ on the buyer’s reaction coefficient β, a proxy
for value relevance, is ambiguous. Although value relevance is decreasing in success fee
for most cases, there are settings in which value relevance is increasing again when the
parameter δ gets closer to its upper bound of one.
The reason for this ambiguous effect is not obvious and requires further analysis of the
first-order derivative dβ/dδ. According to the equilibrium definition, the coefficient β
is directly affected by the success fee δ, but also indirectly via λx. Therefore, varying
the parameter value of δ has a direct effect and an indirect effect on value relevance as
described in Corollary 7.
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i = 2, γ = 1)
Corollary 7 An increasing success fee δ has a direct effect (Dβ) and an indirect effect (Iβ)

















︸         ︷︷         ︸
Iβ > 0
. (25)
The direct effect Dβ represents the change of β implied by a marginal increase of success
fee δ if the manager’s biasing coefficient λx is held constant. An increasing success fee
increases the intermediary’s incentive to bias. The buyer anticipates that and relies less
on the intermediary report when pricing the firm, value relevance decreases. On the other
hand, the indirect effect Iβ takes into account that value relevance is also affected by the
manager’s reaction following a change in success fee. An increasing success fee lowers
the manager’s incentive to bias what in turn increases the buyer’s reaction coefficient.
For most cases, the direct effect dominates the indirect effect, i.e., value relevance is de-
creasing in success fee. For the lower benchmark of zero success fee as the starting point,
an increasing success fee leads always to a decreasing value relevance as the direct effect
dominates. However, for success fee values closer to one, the direct effect does not nec-
essarily dominate the indirect effect anymore.
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The cases where value relevance is increasing in success fee are characterized by a signif-
icantly higher uncertainty about managerial reporting incentives, i.e., σ2m compared to the
uncertainty about the reporting incentives of the intermediary combined with a relatively
high success fee close to one. Thereby, the success fee serves as a balancing tool of how
much uncertainty in the intermediary report is due to managerial bias and how much is
due to intermediary bias.
In the lower benchmark case of a zero success fee, the intermediary has no incentive to
bias and all of the report uncertainty is driven by managerial bias which the intermediary
tries to remove and value relevance is maximized. However, it is important to understand
that the intermediary does not know the incentive rate of the manager. Therefore, the
intermediary cannot remove all of the managerial bias when updating his belief about
firm value. For a small, but positive success fee, the intermediary starts biasing as well,
therefore adding noise to the report and value relevance is decreasing. In the intermediate
range of success fee, the buyer cannot distinguish to what extent the report uncertainty
is due to the manager and to what extent due to the intermediary such that information
content and therefore value relevance is further decreasing.
As described before, for a low success fee, most of the report uncertainty is due to the
manager’s bias and the uncertainty about her incentives. The higher the success fee, the
higher is the share in total uncertainty that stems from intermediary activities as the man-
ager has less incentives to bias anymore and λx approaches zero (see Lemma 1). Even
though the intermediary biases more in case of a higher success fee, the buyer learns
more from the intermediary report due to lower managerial biasing. If the success fee is
close to one and if uncertainty about intermediary incentives is relatively low compared
to the manager, value relevance is increasing in success fee as a higher weight is shifted
on the intermediary, reducing overall uncertainty of the report because the indirect effect
outweighs the direct effect.
Proposition 1 summarizes the findings and provides a condition for a positive relation of
success fee and value relevance.
Proposition 1 Value relevance can be increasing in success fee for certain parameter
settings:
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a) For success fee values close to zero and if uncertainty about the incentives of the
intermediary is non-zero, i.e., σ2i > 0, value relevance is always decreasing in the
success fee.
b) For larger success fee values and if the uncertainty about managerial incentives is
sufficiently high compared to the uncertainty about the incentives of the intermediary,
value relevance is increasing in success fee if the following condition holds true:11
1 − β
β2
· λx · Σ ·Ω
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
> δ · σ2i · ∆. (26)
Figure 3 illustrates the general case of a decreasing value relevance (σ2m = 2) and an
example in which value relevance is increasing in success fee for values close to one
(σ2m = 800).









i = 2, γ = 1)
The analysis of comparative statics shows that the buyer’s reaction coefficient β and both
biasing incentives, λx and ωx, are increasing in the synergy importance parameter γ. Fig-
ure 4 shows this relation graphically.





, Ω = Σ
2
Σ+λ2x ·σ2m
and ∆ = 3 · λ2x + Σσ2m .
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i = 2, δ = 0.8)
The intuition behind this result lies in the information content of the intermediary’s report
from the buyer’s perspective. A higher parameter value γ means that the buyer assigns a
higher weight to the synergy value when estimating total firm value and pricing the firm.
The intermediary conveys information about synergy value when reporting to the buyer.
Thus, a higher synergy importance γ means that the buyer learns more about firm value
from the intermediary’s report due to a higher information content of the report. As a con-
sequence, the buyer puts more weight on the intermediary report when pricing the target
firm, i.e., the reaction coefficient β increases. On the other hand, the positive correlation
between the synergy importance γ and β has a direct effect on the biasing coefficients of
the manager and the intermediary. They anticipate that a higher interest in synergy value
leads to a higher reaction of the buyer and this effect increases the biasing incentives of
both players. Consequently, reporting bias is increasing in synergy importance γ for both,
the manager and the intermediary. Proposition 2 describes the relation between value
relevance and synergy importance.
Proposition 2 Value relevance is always increasing in synergy importance.
The relation between price efficiency and synergy importance is driven by the positive
correlation of value relevance and synergy importance. Therefore, no additional analysis
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regarding price efficiency and synergy importance is made as the results are straightfor-
ward.
The paper focuses in the analysis on the success fee δ and the synergy importance γ. How-
ever, the results from Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) hold in this model, i.e., the buyer’s
reaction coefficient β as a proxy for value relevance is increasing in value uncertainty
(σ2η, σ
2









intuition for these results builds on the intermediary report’s information content for the
buyer when determining the transaction price. The lower the uncertainty of the interme-
diary report, the higher is the information content to the buyer and therefore the buyer’s
reaction coefficient β.12
The negative relation between value relevance and the variance of the intermediary’s syn-
ergy signal σ2z suggests that value relevance is always higher if the intermediary hired
by the target is of high quality. On that note, this result serves as a possible explanation
for the empirical finding of high success fees paid to high quality investment banks (see
Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; Walter, Yawson, and Yeung, 2008).
Price efficiency
In this section, I analyze the relation between success fee and price efficiency. As de-
scribed before, price efficiency in the model’s context of M&A transactions can be inter-
preted as a proxy for the difference between the true value of the target firm including
synergies and the transaction price. The higher the price efficiency, the smaller is the dif-
ference between the true value and the price. The lower the price efficiency, the higher
is the possibility that the buyer over- or underpays. According to Goold and Campbell
(1998), even synergy-producing transactions are prone to overpayments. Due to the as-
sumption of normal distributions of random variables, the possibility is equally high for
over- and underpayment, respectively. This interpretation is feasible because it is assumed
that the buyer is taking into account the synergy value of the target firm when setting the
price.13
12 For a detailed explanation of the intuition see Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Feller and Schäfer
(2019).
13 A difference between the assets of the target, i.e., the book value, and the transaction price can be an
indicator for the target’s synergy value to the buyer. This difference, however, has nothing to do with price
efficiency.
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In order to study price efficiency, I first define the derivative of price efficiency with re-
spect to success fee. Similar to the analysis of value relevance, Corollary 8 shows that the
effect of success fee on price efficiency is a priori ambiguous.


















︸              ︷︷              ︸
Eλ > 0
. (27)
On one hand, price efficiency is affected by success fee via the change in the buyer’s re-
action coefficient induced by a change in δ, Eβ. As shown before, the reaction of value
relevance to a changing success fee is ambiguous, but in most cases β is decreasing in δ.
The reason is that an increasing success fee provides the intermediary with higher incen-
tives to bias the report. This leads to a lower information content due to an increasing
variance and thus to a lower price efficiency. On the other hand, the term Γ is always
increasing in δ such that Eλ is positive. This follows directly from the negative relation
between the manager’s biasing coefficient λx and the success fee. A higher success fee
implies a lower interest in the transaction price on the manager’s side. Hence, the manager
biases less and the overall report becomes more informative as the cumulative uncertainty
about managerial incentives decreases. Consequently, price efficiency increases in suc-
cess fee.
Further analysis of price efficiency requires a closer look at the uncertainty about man-
ager and intermediary incentives, i.e., σ2m and σ
2
i , as they drive the information content
of the intermediary report ri and therefore price efficiency. The success fee serves as a
balancing tool and determines how much of the total uncertainty in the report is due to the
uncertainty about manager’s biasing incentives (low success fee) and how much of it is
due to the uncertainty about intermediary’s biasing incentives (high success fee). In order
to analyze the interplay of incentive uncertainty of the manager and the intermediary, i.e.,
σ2m and σ
2
i , I study the impact of success fee on value relevance and price efficiency for
isolated incentive parameters.
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First, I look at the case when there is no uncertainty about managerial biasing incentives,
that is when σ2m = 0. In that case, value relevance β and price efficiency PE are of the























Value relevance and price efficiency do not depend on managerial biasing incentives λx
anymore. Hence, comparative statics with respect to the success fee δ become well-
defined as they only depend on the buyer’s reaction coefficient β. The derivative of value
relevance with respect to δ is solely driven by the success fee such that Eβ is strictly
negative. The derivative of price efficiency is solely driven by the impact of δ on value



















In the case of no uncertainty about the managerial bias, value relevance and price effi-
ciency are decreasing in success fee. From the buyer’s perspective, the higher the success
fee, the more uncertainty in form of intermediary variance is added to the report. An
increasing success fee leads to a shift away from the known managerial incentives to the
unknown intermediary incentives, thereby increasing overall uncertainty which results in
a lower value relevance and consequently in a lower price efficiency.
To study the equilibrium properties of the model when there is only uncertainty about the
managerial incentives, I set the intermediary uncertainty to zero, i.e., σ2i = 0 and obtain


























The case of no uncertainty about intermediary incentives is equivalent to the benchmark
case of zero success fee. Because the buyer perfectly knows the intermediary incentives,
i.e., he knows the realization xi, he simply deducts the bias from the intermediary’s report
ri reflected in a negative α in the buyer’s pricing function. Hence, the buyer learns the best
estimate of the firm value given the entire information set of the intermediary. Since value
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relevance is always at the maximum level of one for all δ ∈ [0, 1], price efficiency only
depends on the managerial biasing incentive coefficient λx. Consequently, the derivative
of price efficiency with respect to success fee is solely driven by the derivative of λx with












From the buyer’s perspective, the entire uncertainty in the report stems from unknown
managerial incentives. A higher success fee reduces this uncertainty because it reduces
managerial biasing incentives and shifts a higher weight towards the intermediary whose
incentives are known. Consequently, price efficiency is increasing in success fee when
there is no uncertainty about intermediary incentives.
If there is uncertainty about the incentives of both players, the manager and the interme-
diary, i.e., if σ2m, σ
2
i > 0, then price efficiency is either increasing or decreasing in success
fee, depending on the parameter settings. Furthermore, price efficiency is maximized for
an intermediate success fee δ∗ ∈ (0, 1). From a price efficiency perspective, this means
that it is never optimal to set a corner solution success fee δ = 0 or δ = 1 because there
always exists a success fee other than a corner solution which leads to a higher price effi-
ciency.
Proposition 3 summarizes the findings on the ambiguous relation between price efficiency
and success fee.
Proposition 3 The effect of success fee on price efficiency is a priori ambiguous and is
determined by the level of reporting uncertainty of the manager and the intermediary,
measured by the variance of biasing incentives σ2m and σ
2
i , respectively:
a) If there is no uncertainty about managerial incentives, i.e., σ2m = 0, but the incentives
of the intermediary are uncertain, price efficiency is maximized for the corner solution
success fee δ∗ = 0 and is always decreasing in success fee.
b) In the case of known incentives of the intermediary, i.e., σ2i = 0, but uncertain man-
agerial incentives, price efficiency is strictly increasing in success fee and is maxi-
mized for the corner solution success fee δ∗ = 1.
c) If there is uncertainty about the incentives of both, the manager and the intermediary,
the success fee that maximizes price efficiency is an interior solution, i.e., δ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 5 illustrates the findings from Proposition 3 and provides a graphical intuition for
each of the three cases.







z = 2, γ = 1)
2.6 Conclusion
This study examines reporting bias in M&A transactions and its implications for value
relevance and price efficiency. I find that especially the success fee rate plays an essential
role by affecting misreporting incentives and therefore the information content in reported
firm value.
The buyer’s reaction coefficient to the intermediary report as a proxy for value relevance
is always maximized in the case of zero success fee. Except for certain situations, value
relevance is continuously decreasing in success fee so that the buyer relies less on the
report for an increasing success fee when pricing the firm. With a success fee of zero, the
intermediary has no incentive to bias and reports only his best estimate of firm value to
the buyer. As a consequence, the buyer relies completely on the intermediary report when
pricing the firm due to superior information of the intermediary.
Surprisingly, this does not need to be the case for the relation between price efficiency
and success fee. The success fee influences biasing incentives of the manager and the
intermediary which affects price efficiency via counteracting effects. Thereby, the success
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fee balances the two effects. I show that there always exists an interior solution for suc-
cess fee that maximizes price efficiency if there is uncertainty about reporting incentives
of both players, the manager and the intermediary. Compared to the case of zero success
fee, price efficiency is always higher for a marginal positive success fee. At the other end,
price efficiency is always higher for a success fee slightly below one compared to the case
of a maximum success fee equal to one. From the buyer’s perspective, a small but positive
success fee or a success fee just below one is therefore always favorable compared to the
corner solutions of a success fee equal to zero or equal to one.
As an additional result, the model shows that value relevance is always higher if the inter-
mediary hired by the target is of high quality, i.e., his synergy signal variance is low.
Furthermore, I find that an increasing synergy relevance on the buyer’s side always in-
creases value relevance (and price efficiency). As an empirical implication, the model
predicts that a buyer with a higher interest in synergy value places a higher weight on
the intermediary’s report when pricing the target firm compared to a buyer with lower
synergy value interest. It is left for future empirical studies to test this hypothesis.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The linear equilibrium is derived by finding the best responses of each player given their
conjectures of the others’ strategies. In equilibrium, the conjectured coefficients are equal
to the best response coefficients. Given the intermediary’s conjectures of the manager’s
reporting function (see (7)) and the buyer’s pricing function (see (9)), the intermediary’s
expected utility function becomes:
E[Ui] = xi · δ · (α + β · ri) −
1
2
· E[(ṽ − ri)2|rm, z]. (32)
By differentiating the utility function with respect to ri, the best response of the interme-
diary given his information and conjectures results:
ri = E[ṽ|rm, z] + xi · δ · β. (33)
Matching coefficients yields:
ω0 = ωr = ωz = 0 and ωx = δ · β. (34)
Given the manager’s conjectures of the intermediary’s reporting function (see (8)) and
the buyer’s pricing function (see (9)), the manager’s expected utility function takes the
following form:
E[Um] = xm · (1 − δ) · (α + β · (E [Ei[ṽ|rm, z]|rm] + ω0 + ωr · rm + ωz · z + ωx · xi)) −
1
2
· E[(ṽ − rm)2|e]. (35)
In the above expression, Ei[.] denotes the expectation under the assumed intermediary
conjecture of the manager’s reporting function (see (7)) and thus represents a higher or-
der belief of the manager. The manager can influence the conditional expectation by
her report rm. Therefore, the expression from the manager’s view can be rewritten as
conditional expectation on the manager’s report rm instead of her signal e. Further, the
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conditional expectation can be rewritten as:
E [Ei[ṽ|rm, z]|rm] =
Cov[ṽ, r̃m] · Var [z̃] −Cov[ṽ, z̃] ·Cov[z̃, r̃m]
Var [z̃] · Var [r̃m] −Cov[z̃, r̃m]2
· (rm − E [r̃m]) . (36)
Since I assume that the two firm value components asset value η̃ and synergy value s̃ are
uncorrelated, i.e., Cov[z̃, r̃m] = 0, the term simplifies to:
E [Ei[ṽ|rm, z]|rm] =
Cov[ṽ, r̃m]
Var [r̃m]
· (rm − E [r̃m]) . (37)
By plugging in the parameter values of the intermediary’s reporting function from (34)
and rewriting the expression E[(ṽ − rm)2|e], the manager’s utility function can be written
as:
E[Um] = xm · (1 − δ) ·
(










Var [ṽ|e] + (E [ṽ|e] − rm)2
)
. (38)
Taking the derivative with respect to rm yields the manager’s best response:
rm = E[ṽ|e] + xm · (1 − δ) · β ·
Σ
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
λx
. (39)





corresponds to Cov[ṽ, r̃m] and the term Σ+λ
2
x ·σ2m to Var[r̃m].
Comparison with (7) and matching coefficients yields:




Given the conjectures on the reporting strategies of the manager and the intermediary, the
buyer observes the intermediary’s report and tries to infer the total value of the firm. Thus,
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the buyer sets the price according to:
P(ri) = E[ṽ|ri] =
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ + ω2x · σ2i
︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
β
·(ri − ωx · µi). (41)







. The term Σ
2
Σ+λ2x·σ2m
+ Ψ is equal to
Cov [ṽ, r̃i] and Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]].
Thus, matching coefficients with the conjectured pricing function (see (9)) yields:
α = −β2 · δ · µi and β =
Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]]
Var [E[ṽ|rm, z]] + ω2x · σ2i
. (42)

Proof of Corollary 1
According to Lemma 1, the three reaction coefficients λx, ωx and β are implicitly defined
in equilibrium:
λx = (1 − δ) · β ·
(
Σ
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
)
, (43)
ωx = δ · β = δ ·
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m




Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ + δ2 · β2 · σ2
i
. (45)
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· (λx − (1 − δ) · β)
︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
LHS λ
= 0, (46)
β3 · δ2 · σ2i + (β − 1) ·
(
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ
)
︸                                               ︷︷                                               ︸
LHS β
= 0. (47)
The following argumentation only holds for non-benchmark situations, i.e., when the
success fee rate δ is non-zero and positive and therefore β is strictly lower than 1. First,
consider the implicit function of λx (46). Suppose that λx = 0. The left hand side of
(46), LHS λ, becomes strictly negative which is a contradiction. The same argumentation
holds for the implicit function of β. When β = 0, the left hand side of equation (47),
LHS β, becomes strictly negative which again is a contradiction. Thus, λx and β both have
lower bounds of zero. The reaction coefficients have upper bounds, too. Suppose that
λx = (1 − δ) · β. Then again the equation (46) contradicts since LHS λ is strictly positive.
Similarly, suppose that β = 1. It follows that the LHS β of (47) becomes strictly positive
which is a contradiction. Hence, λx and β are bounded from above by (1 − δ) · β and
1, respectively. However, there exists a unique equilibrium for each reaction coefficient
which lies in between their lower and upper bounds. This follows directly from the strictly
positive slopes of LHS λ in λx for a given β and LHS β in β for a given λx:
∂LHS λ
∂λx






= 3 · β2 · δ2 · σ2i +
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ > 0. (49)
Having shown that LHS λ is strictly increasing in λx, LHS β is strictly increasing in β and
both reaction coefficients are bounded, the equilibrium coefficients λx and βx must lie
between their lower and upper bounds:
λx ∈ (0, (1 − δ) · β) and β ∈ (0, 1) . (50)
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It is easy to see that ωx is bounded as follows:
ωx ∈ (0, δ · β) . (51)

Proof of Corollary 2
Plugging in δ = 0 into Lemma 1 yields the coefficients shown in Corollary 2. 
Proof of Corollary 3
According to Corollary 3, the manager’s biasing coefficient λx is maximized in the bench-
mark case of a zero success fee. To show that λx reaches the maximum for δ equal to zero,
it is sufficient to show that λx for δ = 0 is strictly higher than λx for δ = 1 and that λx is

















The sign of ∂λx/∂δ is negative and follows directly from the proof of Corollary 6. 
Proof of Corollary 4
Analogously to the proof of Corollary 2, plugging in δ = 1 into the coefficients of Lemma
1 yields the results of Corollary 4. 
Proof of Corollary 5
Corollary 5 follows directly from a comparison of Corollary 2 and Corollary 4 and using
Corollary 6 to see that the sign of ∂ωx/∂δ is positive. 
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Proof of Corollary 6
To show comparative statics, I use the implicit function theorem. Define for the parameter
a ∈
{











































. A comparison with (46) and (47) shows that
the equilibrium coefficients β and λx are implicitly given by the condition F(a, β, λx) = 0.
According to the implicit function theorem, β and λx can be stated as a function of a and





























































3 · β2 · δ2 · σ2
i
+ Ω + Ψ
)
· ∆ + (1 − β) · 2 · (1 − δ) · λx · Σ ·Ω
Σ + λ2x · σ2m





∆ (β − 1) ·
2 · λx · σ2m ·Ω
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
(1 − δ) · Σ
σ2m
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2 · β ·
(
β2 · δ · σ2i · ∆ − (1 − β) ·
λx · Σ ·Ω
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The given signs can easily be verified considering the restriction 0 < β < 1.
The derivate of ωx with respect to γ is solely determined by β and therefore positive,


















︸         ︷︷         ︸
Iω ≷ 0
. (58)
The direct effect Dω is always positive while the sign of the indirect effect Iω can be posi-
tive or negative. It is a priori not clear which effect dominates and what the resulting sign
of the derivative is. However, plugging the derivatives into equation (58) and rearranging




β · (Π · (Ξ + Ω + Ψ) + 2 · (1 − β) · λ · Σ ·Ω + Σ · ∆ · (Ξ + Ω + Ψ))
Π · (3 · Ξ + Ω + Ψ) + 2 · (1 − β) · (1 − δ) · λx · Σ ·Ω + Σ · ∆ · (3 · Ξ + Ω + Ψ)
, (59)
where Ξ = β2 · δ2 · σ2i and Π = λ2x · σ2m · ∆.
It is easy to see that the sign of equation (59) is strictly positive.
Chapter 2. Reporting Bias in Mergers & Acquisitions 85
The derivatives of β with respect to the other parameters are presented below. The same
substitutions for Σ, Ω, Ψ and ∆ are used:
∂β
∂σ2m
= −Φ · (1 − β) ·
λ2x ·Ω











= −Φ · β3 · δ2 · ∆ < 0, (61)
∂β
∂σ2η
= Φ · (1 − β) ·
(
∆ · Θ − (λx − (1 − δ) · β)
︸              ︷︷              ︸








= Φ · (1 − β) ·
γ2 · σ2s ·
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= −Φ · (1 − β) ·
σ4η · Σ ·
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2 · λ2x ·
(
Σ + σ2m · ∆
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Λ = 4 · λx · σ2e + σ2η.

Proof of Corollary 7
The equilibrium coefficient β is defined in (41). Taking the derivative with respect to
success fee δ and using Corollary 6 for the signs of the derivatives yields the results
described in Corollary 7. Note that the same results are obtained if ωx is not replaced
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Proof of Proposition 1
From Corollary 2 follows that the value relevance β reaches the maximum of one for a





= 0. To show that
value relevance is always decreasing in success fee for small values of δ it is sufficient to
show that the second derivate of β with respect to δ evaluated at δ = 0 is negative. If δ = 0
and β = 1 are plugged into the second derivative of β with respect to δ, the following


















(Ω + Ψ) · ∆ . (67)
The condition for an increasing value relevance in success fee follows directly from Corol-
lary 6. Setting ∂β/∂δ > 0 and using simple algebra yields the stated condition. 
Proof of Corollary 8
For the purpose of analyzing the interplay of price efficiency and success fee, we can
rewrite the definition of price efficiency PE from equation (15) in equilibrium as follows:
PE = β · Cov [ṽ, r̃i]
Var [ṽ]
︸      ︷︷      ︸
Γ
, (68)
where Cov [ṽ, r̃i] =
Σ2
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
+ Ψ and Var [ṽ] = σ2η + γ
2 · σ2s .
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From Corollary 6 follows directly the ambiguous derivative of β with respect to δ. Since
Γ does not directly depend on the success fee δ, it is only indirectly affected via the impact
of δ on the manager’s biasing coefficient λx. It is easy to see that Γ is decreasing in λx,
i.e., ∂Γ/∂λx < 0. Knowing that λx is decreasing, it follows that the term Γ is increasing in
δ. 
Proof of Proposition 3
To show that value relevance and price efficiency are decreasing in success fee for the
case of known managerial incentives, I plug σ2m = 0 into the definition of value relevance























It is easy to see that value relevance β is decreasing in success fee δ. Hence, it follows
that price efficiency is also decreasing in success fee.
Similarly, plugging σ2i = 0 into (45) and (68) to analyze value relevance and price effi-



























Knowing that the sign of ∂λx/∂δ is negative, it is easy to see that price efficiency is in-
creasing in success fee δ.
To show that there is an interior solution for success fee where price efficiency is maxi-
mized, it is sufficient to prove existence. An interior solution δ∗ exists if price efficiency is
increasing at δ = 0 and decreasing at δ = 1, indicating that price efficiency is maximized
for a success fee in between the corner points, i.e., that there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Using the definition of dPE/dδ from Corollary 8 and plugging in the derivatives from












−Φ · 2 · β ·
(
β2 · δ · σ2i · ∆ − (1 − β) ·
λx · Σ ·Ω
Σ + λ2x · σ2m
)











β2 · δ · σ2i · (2 + δ) + Ω + Ψ
)
)
︸                                                     ︷︷                                                     ︸
∂λx/∂δ
. (71)
According to Corollary 2, the buyer’s reaction coefficient β is equal to one in the corner
point of zero success fee. Plugging δ = 0 and β = 1 into (71) and knowing that ∂Γ/∂λx
is negative, the derivative of price efficiency PE with respect to success fee evaluated at















· (Ω + Ψ) > 0. (72)
For the other corner point of a success fee equal to one, the manager has no incentive to
bias and therefore λx is equal to zero. This follows directly from Lemma 1. Hence, the









= −Φ · 2 · β3 ·
σ2i · Σ
σ2m
· Γ < 0. (73)

15 Note that ∆ = 3 · λ2x + Σσ2m .
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Chapter 3
Investor Sophistication, Earnings Management
and Market Efficiency∗
Abstract
We study how the degree of investor sophistication affects firms’ incentives for earnings
management and market efficiency. In our model, a higher fraction of informed traders
always reduces manipulation incentives and makes prices better indicators of firm value.
However, we find ambiguous effects for markets where either a higher fraction of investors
reacts only to a subset of the available information or where more investors trade for liq-
uidity reasons. Specifically, we find that a higher fraction of liquidity traders can actually
mitigate accounting manipulation and a higher fraction of limited attention traders almost
always increases market efficiency. Our results suggest that carefully chosen measures of
investor sophistication are an important prerequisite for empirical research on the associ-
ation between investor sophistication and market outcomes.
Keywords: earnings management, limited attention, capital market, price efficiency
∗ This thesis chapter is based on the unpublished working paper:
Feller, Miró and Robert F. Göx (2020). “Investor Sophistication, Earnings Management and Market Effi-
ciency”, University of Zurich.
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3.1 Introduction
A rich body of theoretical and empirical accounting literature suggests that firms manipu-
late accounting reports to boost their stock market valuation. In this paper, we study how
the degree of investor sophistication in the stock market affects the subtle interplay be-
tween the market response to potentially biased accounting reports and firms’ incentives
for earnings management and, more fundamentally, how the degree of investor sophisti-
cation affects the efficiency of the capital market.
Contrary to conventional wisdom and empirical evidence (Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkat-
achalam, 2002; Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt, 2002) we find that a lower degree of
investor sophistication can induce a weaker market response to manipulated accounting
reports and reduce firms’ incentives for accounting manipulation. More generally, we also
identify conditions under which a lower degree of investor sophistication can increase the
price efficiency of the stock market. Our study also suggests that carefully chosen mea-
sures of investor sophistication are a critical factor for the evaluation and empirical mea-
surement of the relation between investor sophistication and capital market outcomes.
To address our research question, we introduce earnings management and varying de-
grees of investor sophistication into in a standard competitive linear rational expectations
model (Vives, 2008; Goldstein and Yang, 2017). In the model, a manager with unknown
reporting objectives as in Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Dye and Sridhar (2004) ob-
serves an unbiased signal about firm value and issues a biased accounting report to the
capital market. Unlike prior signal jamming models of earnings management, we do not
consider a representative risk-neutral investor but a capital market with a unit mass of
heterogeneous investors that differ in their information processing capacities, information
endowments and trading motives.
Our model features four trader types. As in the standard linear rational expectations
model, there are informed investors, uninformed investors and liquidity traders where
the latter place orders for the firm’s shares based on exogenous liquidity reasons. All
other traders are risk-averse portfolio investors considering the information about firm
value in their investment decisions. While all traders observe the firm’s accounting re-
port, informed traders also observe a private signal of the firm’s asset value. Because the
informed traders’ private information is reflected in their investment decisions, the share
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price is informative about firm value and allows investors to condition their orders on the
private information contained in the share price.
As in Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011), we assume that a
part of the uninformed investors exhibits limited information processing capacity prevent-
ing them from incorporating all available public information into their trading decisions.
Specifically, we assume that limited attention traders base their investment decisions on
the accounting report but do not consider the share price as an additional value signal in
their investment decisions. Using this framework, we rank the four investor types in our
model according to their degree of sophistication beginning with the most sophisticated
informed investors, followed by the uninformed traders, the limited attention traders and
the liquidity traders as the least sophisticated trader category.
The equilibrium stock price in our model is found by equating the demand of all four
trader types with an exogenously given supply. The key variable in our model is the mar-
ket response to the firm’s earnings report because it not only determines the importance
of the firms’ accounting report for firm valuation but also the expected level of earnings
management. We first show that an increased fraction of informed investors decreases
the price response to the firm’s accounting report and the equilibrium level of earnings
management. The opposite effect holds true if the fraction of limited attention traders
increases. In both cases, we consider changes within the group of risk-averse traders
taking the uninformed investors as the numeraire. Consistent with conventional wisdom
and empirical evidence (Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2002; Balsam, Bartov,
and Marquardt, 2002), these results suggest that an increasing degree of investor sophis-
tication reduces the price response to biased accounting reports and thereby mitigates the
firm’s incentives for earnings management.
However, this intuition no longer holds if we consider a further decline in the aggregate
sophistication level due to an increasing fraction of liquidity traders. Particularly, we find
that a larger proportion of liquidity traders in the market can actually cause a lower price
response to the firms accounting report and thereby reduce the firm’s manipulation incen-
tives. The reason for this result stems from two countervailing forces of liquidity trader
demand on the earnings response coefficient. On one hand, an increasing share of liquid-
ity traders implies a lower sensitivity of the aggregate demand for shares to the accounting
report because a lower share of total trade is based on the firm’s accounting report. On
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the other hand, a higher fraction of liquidity traders increases the aggregate valuation risk
in the market which reduces the sensitivity of demand to changes of the share price. Be-
cause the price reaction to the firm’s accounting report is determined by the ratio of both
effects, a larger share of liquidity traders reduces the price response coefficient whenever
the relative magnitude of the demand effect is larger than the relative decline of the price
sensitivity.
We also study how the degree of investor sophistication affects the price efficiency of the
stock market. We first show that an increasing fraction of informed investors increases the
efficiency of the stock market in the sense that price becomes a more precise measure of
value. In line with the findings of De Long et al. (1987), the opposite effect occurs if the
fraction of liquidity traders increases. In both cases, this observation is consistent with
the intuitively appealing notion that a higher degree of investor sophistication increases
market efficiency because more informed trade makes prices better measures of value.
However, our second main finding shows that this conclusion does not hold for all possi-
ble changes in the degree of sophistication. Specifically, we find that price efficiency can
be increasing in the fraction of limited attention traders. The reason for this result is that
the fraction of limited attention traders decreases both, the covariance between value and
price and the variance of the price. Because price efficiency is negatively affected by a
lower covariance but positively affected by a lower price volatility, more limited attention
traders increase the price efficiency if the latter effect dominates the former.
Overall, the results of our study indicate that the effects of investor sophistication on the
market response to biased accounting signals and the overall efficiency of capital markets
are ambiguous and critically depend on the available measures of investor sophistication.
While replacing uninformed traders with informed traders always affects outcomes as
expected, an increasing share of investors who react only to a subset of the available in-
formation or who trade for exogenous reasons can actually have desirable consequences
so that it mitigates accounting manipulation and increases market efficiency.
Our study contributes to the theoretical literature on earnings management in a capital
market setting. In this literature, a manager issues a biased earnings report to increase the
investors’ perceptions of firm value. Early models such as Narayanan (1985) and Stein
(1989) assume that market participants know all parameters of the manager’s objective
function and perfectly anticipate the bias in the earnings report. In such a setting the man-
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ager cannot affect the stock price but still bears the costs of manipulating the report. As
shown by Fischer and Verrecchia (2000), this dilemma can partly be resolved if there is
asymmetric information regarding the manager’s reporting incentives. Specifically, they
show that a higher uncertainty regarding the manager’s interest in the stock price reduces
the market reaction to the firm’s earnings report and thereby mitigates the manager’s re-
porting incentives. In a closely related paper, Dye and Sridhar (2004) study a setting
where the market is uncertain about the manager’s misreporting costs and derive similar
results. While both approaches yield comparable insights about the relation between the
market response to the firm’s accounting report and the manager’s manipulation incen-
tives, we follow the latter approach to keep the comparative static analysis of our model
tractable.
Several other papers extend the models of Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) and Dye and
Sridhar (2004). Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005) introduce real earnings management and
show that tighter accounting standards affect the manager’s choice between real and
accrual-based earnings management. Other studies considering uncertainty about man-
agerial reporting objectives study the role of the audit committee for the manager’s earn-
ings management (Caskey, Nagar, and Petacchi, 2010), multiple firm disclosure (Heinle
and Verrecchia, 2016), the role of endogenous compensation contracts (Goldman and
Slezak, 2006) or the consequences of uncertainty about the manager’s reputational con-
cerns (Feller and Schäfer, 2019).
Unlike our paper, almost all signal jamming models of earnings management consider
a capital market with a single representative risk-neutral investor. A notable exception
is Fischer and Stocken (2004) who study earnings management in the context of a Kyle
(1985) model. As in our paper, this model features a privately informed speculator and
liquidity traders albeit all players are risk-neutral. Different from Kyle (1985), the specu-
lator can be privately informed about the manager’s reporting incentives in addition to his
private value signal. Consistent with our findings, a speculator with more precise value
information mitigates the manager’s manipulation incentives. The opposite result holds
if the speculator has better information about the manager’s reporting incentives. Con-
sidering both effects, the presence of a privately informed speculator can have ambiguous
effects on price efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first to study the role of different degrees
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of investor sophistication in the context of an earnings management model. Compared
to Fischer and Stocken (2004), our model features risk-averse portfolio investors, that
vary in their information endowment an information processing capacity. While models
with multiple trader types (Vives, 2008; Goldstein and Yang, 2017) and limited attention
traders (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2011) are common in
the finance literature, these models typically do not consider earnings management.1 In
addition, the population of liquidity traders is typically kept fixed in these models and not
considered as a fraction of total mass of traders in the market. The results of our analysis
suggest that these differences are important for a detailed understanding of the subtle re-
lation between the degree of investor sophistication, earnings management incentives and
the overall efficiency of capital markets.
Our model also contributes to the empirical literature on the role of investor sophistication
in capital markets. For example, there is ample evidence of post-earnings announcement
drift (see Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989) that causes stock prices
to underreact to earnings surprises. Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000) find
a negative association between post-earnings-announcement and investor sophistication
where investor sophistication is measured by institutional ownership due to their superior
information processing capacity. In related studies Della Vigna and Pollet (2009) and
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) present evidence for an empirical association between
the presence of limited attention traders and post-earnings announcement drift. Finally,
Jiambalvo, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2002) and Balsam, Bartov, and Marquardt
(2002) study the relation between investor sophistication and earnings management. They
find that higher institutional ownership is negatively associated with discretionary accru-
als suggesting that the presence of sophisticated investors reduces earnings management.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the model setup. Section
3.3 characterizes the equilibrium properties. Section 3.4 analyzes the relation between
investor sophistication and earnings management. Section 3.5 studies the role of investor
sophistication for price efficiency. Section 3.6 summarizes our findings and concludes.
1 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) study a related problem where firms can strategically disclose pro forma
earnings by deducting a given expense item from its GAAP earnings. Unlike our model, limited atten-
tion traders do not fully understand the firm’s incentives for non-GAAP reporting and take the pro forma
numbers at face value when valuing the firm.
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3.2 Model setup
We consider a single period reporting game. At the beginning of the period (date t = 1),
a firm with unknown net asset value ṽ is traded in a competitive capital market at an
endogenous stock price p. At the end of the period (date t = 2), the firm’s final asset
value v is realized and consumed by investors. We assume that v is drawn from a normal
distribution with mean zero and precision 1/τv where τv = σ
−2
v .
Prior to the market opening at date t = 1, the firm’s manager privately observes a perfect
signal of the firm’s asset value and issues a potentially biased accounting report r to the
market. Following prior literature (see Stein, 1989; Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Dye and
Sridhar, 2004; Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2005), we assume that the manager maximizes the
difference between the firm’s stock price and the costs of misreporting. Accordingly, the
manager’s utility function takes the form:
UM = p −
1
2
· (r − v − η)2. (1)
To prevent that the market can perfectly back out the manager’s reporting bias, we follow
Dye and Sridhar (2004) in assuming that the manager’s misreporting costs cannot be per-
fectly inferred by the market participants. Specifically, we let η be drawn form a normally





and assume that the manager privately observes
its realization before issuing the report.
Unlike the prior earnings management literature, we assume that the firm is traded in a
market with heterogeneous investors that differ regarding their information endowment,
trading motives (Goldstein and Yang, 2017; Vives, 2008), and their information process-
ing capacity (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2011). Specifically,
we assume that there is a unit mass of investors that can be of four different types. As
in Goldstein and Yang (2017) and Vives (2008), there are informed investors, uninformed
investors and liquidity traders. Informed and uninformed traders are risk-averse with
CARA utility over final wealth W:
UT = − exp(−γ ·W). (2)
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The investors’ coefficient of risk aversion is denoted by γ > 0. Investors can either buy
q units of the firm’s shares or invest funds into a riskless asset with zero return. With
these assumptions an individual investor with initial wealth w0 realizes a final wealth of
W = w0+q · (v− p) at date 2. Because the initial endowment is immaterial for our results,
we normalize it to zero in what follows.
Informed traders observe a private signal of the firm’s asset value in addition to the ac-
counting report. The signal is a noisy measure of v and takes the form:
s̃i = ṽ + ε̃i, (3)





is a normally distributed noise term determining the precision of the
investor’s private signal. The presence of privately informed investors implies that the
price is informative about the firm’s asset value. Accordingly, sophisticated investors can
condition their demand for the risky asset on the value information contained in the stock
price when placing their orders.
To study the consequences of varying degrees of investor sophistication, we assume that a
part of the uninformed investors has limited information processing capacity. Therefore,
these investors ignore the possibility of conditioning their asset demands on the value
information contained in the asset price and consider only the public accounting report in
valuing the firm. Following Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh
(2011), we label this fourth group of investors as limited attention traders because they
only pay attention to the accounting report. With the total mass of investors normalized
to one we let µI denote the fraction of informed traders and µU the fraction of uninformed
traders that learn from prices, µL the share of limited attention traders and µX the fraction
of liquidity traders. We assume that there are no other traders in the market and each
fraction of traders is represented with a non-negative share so that
∑
µn = 1 for µn ∈ (0, 1)
and n ∈ {I,U, L, X}.
While sophisticated investors and limited attention traders determine their demands for
the firm’s shares by maximizing their expected utility at date 1, liquidity traders place
random orders for exogenous liquidity reasons. In this sense, liquidity traders are the
least sophisticated investor category because their trading decision is completely random
and independent of the public information available to the capital market. Specifically, we
assume that the liquidity traders’ demand for the firm’s shares is randomly drawn from
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. Finally, in order to determine the
individual investors’ demands and the market clearing stock price, we assume that there
is unlimited supply of the riskless asset and an exogenously given supply quantity Q of
the firm’s shares where Q ≥ 0.
3.3 Equilibrium
A rational expectations equilibrium of the reporting game requires the manager to choose
a utility maximizing reporting strategy r for a given conjecture about the stock price p.
Individual investors choose their demand for both assets so that their investment decisions
maximize their expected utility conditional on their information endowment and the stock
price p. The stock price is determined such that the market clears. That is, in equilibrium
demand must equal supply.
We restrict our analysis to linear strategies considering the case where the manager’s
reporting strategy and the market pricing function are linear in the information available to
the players when taking their decisions. In equilibrium, all conjectures about the players’
strategies must be met. Specifically, we conjecture that the manager’s reporting strategy
is an affine function of her private value signal v and biasing costs η such that:
r = r0 + rv · v + rη · η. (4)
In a similar vein, the stock price is determined by the market clearing condition. This
condition requires that the total demand for the firm’s shares including the demand of
liquidity traders equals its total supply Q. Because the demand is a function of the public
and private information available to investors and the noise in the informed investors’
private signals washes out by the law of large numbers, we conjecture that the equilibrium
price is an affine function of the report r, the firm value v and the liquidity traders’ demand
x such that:
p = p0 + pr · r + pv · v + px · x. (5)
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The CARA-normal framework implies that sophisticated investors and limited attention
traders maximize their expected utility and place asset demands as follows:
Dn =
E [ṽ|Ωn] − p
γ · Var [ṽ|Ωn]
, (6)
where E [ṽ|Ω] and Var [ṽ|Ω] are the first and second conditional moment of the firm’s
asset value given the information set Ωn of investor type n ∈ {i,U, L} and p is a given
asset price. Because limited attention traders only consider the manager’s report, their
information set is ΩL = {r} and the demand of a representative limited attention trader
takes the form:
DL =
τη · (r − r0) − (τv + τη) · p
γ
, (7)
where we use the fact that the manager’s report is a random variable from the investor’s
perspective and it holds that E[r̃] = r0. The demand of a limited attention investor is
increasing in the magnitude of the manager’s accounting report and decreasing in the
share price. Quite intuitively, the demand effect of the report is scaled by the precision of
the reporting noise τη. This observation implies that a given accounting report has a higher
impact on the demand for the firm’s shares if investors are better informed about the actual
costs of earnings management. Similarly, the price effect is scaled by the reciprocal of the
conditional variance, Var [ṽ|Ωn]−1 = (τη + τv), which implies that a lower valuation risk
increases the sensitivity of the demand for the firm’s shares to changes in the stock price.
Unlike limited attention investors, sophisticated investors also consider the information
contained in the stock price to learn about the firm’s asset value. However, rather than
considering the stock price as an additional signal in the investors’ information set, it is
sufficient to focus on an adjusted price signal sp that carries only the incremental infor-
mation content in addition to the public accounting report r. To this end, we define the
incremental information contained in the stock price as a signal:
sp =









Using this signal, the information set of informed trader i becomes Ωi = {r, si, sp} and the
information set of a representative uninformed investor becomes ΩU = {r, sp}. Accord-
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ingly, a representative uninformed investor demands
DU = DL +
ρ2 · τx
γ
· (sp − p) (9)
units of the firm’s shares and a single informed investor demands
Di = DU +
τε
γ
· (si − p) (10)
units of the firm’s shares. A closer expectation of the expressions in (9) and (10) shows
that the additional information available to sophisticated investors triggers additional trade
proportional to the precision of the additional signal whenever the asset price deviates
from the signal values observed by the trader. Ordering the unit mass of traders in a
decreasing order of information endowment and integrating over the mass of informed
traders yields the aggregate demand of informed traders DI =
∫ µI
0
Didi. Using this ex-
pression, the market clearing condition equates total asset demand and supply and reads
as:
DI + µU · DU + µL · DL + µX · x = Q. (11)
Substituting the expressions for the demand of the different investor types in (7), (9)
and (10), using the definition of sp and the fact that si approaches v by the law of large
numbers, we can solve the market clearing condition for p and determine the equilibrium
of the reporting game as summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 There exists a linear equilibrium of the reporting game where the man-
ager’s report takes the form as described in (4) and the coefficients of the reporting strat-
egy are:
r0 = pr and rv = rη = 1. (12)
Chapter 3. Investor Sophistication, Earnings Management and Market Efficiency 100
The market price takes the form in (5) with the following equilibrium weights:
p0 = −
(1 − µX) · pr · τη + Q · γ
(1 − µX) · (τη + τv) + (1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε
, (13)
pr =
(1 − µX) · τη
(1 − µX) · (τη + τv) + (1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε
, (14)
pv =
(1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε
(1 − µX) · (τη + τv) + (1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε
, (15)
px =
(1 − µL − µX) · ρ · τx + µX · γ








The manager’s reporting strategy in Proposition 1 takes the form familiar from earnings
management models as in Dye and Sridhar (2004). In equilibrium, the manager’s report
equals:
r = pr + v + η. (18)
That is, the manager reports the sum of her private value signal, the misreporting costs
and a bias that is proportional to the market reaction to her earnings report. The higher the
market reaction to the earnings report, the higher the equilibrium reporting bias. From the
market’s perspective, the manager’s report is a random variable with precision τv ·
τη
τη+τv
which is lower than the precision of the manager’s unbiased value signal and increasing in
the precision of the reporting noise τη. Therefore, the market puts a higher weight on the
manager’s report if it becomes more precise, i.e., if τη is increasing. As a consequence,
a more precise accounting report triggers more earnings management in expectation and
vice versa if the report becomes more noisy. At the same time, the noisy misreporting
costs prevents the market from perfectly backing out the bias from the manager’s report.2
The equilibrium market response to the firm’s earnings report takes the form of the ratio
of the marginal demand changes triggered by a marginal change of the earnings report
2 It is easy to demonstrate that in the absence of misreporting noise, the market would perfectly back
out the bias from the manager’s report and price the firm at its true value. In particular, if σ2η = 0, the
coefficients of the market pricing function would take the form pr = −p0 = 1 and px = pv = 0.
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and the market price of the firm’s shares, respectively. Specifically, we can rewrite the
price response to the firm’s earnings report as:
pr =
(1 − µx) · ∂DL∂r · γ
−
(
µL · ∂DL∂p + µU ·
∂DU
∂p









·γ = τη, the marginal demand effect in the denominator of pr is increasing in
the precision of the manager’s earnings report. Quite intuitively, a more precise earnings
report has a positive effect on the aggregate demand for the firm’s shares and triggers a
higher price reaction. A closer inspection of the expression in (6) shows that the term in











which is a weighted average of the reciprocal of variances of the firm’s asset value calcu-
lated by the three investor types given their information endowments and the denominator
of the pricing coefficients in Proposition 1.3 Because T is inversely related to average risk
in the population of traders, a higher valuation risk reduces the marginal effect of a price
change on the investor’s aggregate demand and thereby triggers a higher price reaction
to the firm’s earnings report for a given precision of the manager’s earnings report. The
structure of the other pricing coefficients in Proposition 1 is similar to the structure of pr.
3.4 Price response to accounting report
In this section, we study how the composition of the trader population in the stock market
affects the components of the equilibrium price. Since the focus of our paper is on the
relation between the degree of investor sophistication and earnings management, the main
part of the analysis centers on the price reaction to the firm’s earnings report. As we know
from Proposition 1 and equation (18), a higher price reaction to the report triggers a higher
reporting bias on the part of the manager such that changes of the equilibrium reaction pr
also induce a higher level of earnings management. Moreover, because E[ṽ] = E[η̃] = 0,
3 Using the fact that 1





2 · τx and 1Var[ṽ|Ωi] −
1
Var[ṽ|ΩU ] = τε, it is
straightforward to show that T = (1 − µX) · (τη + τv) + (1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε.
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the equilibrium price response to the firm’s accounting report also determines the expected
level of earnings management from an ex ante perspective. More formally, it holds that
E[r̃ − ṽ] = pr.
Before studying the relation between the composition of the investor base and the price re-
sponse to the firm’s accounting report in more detail, we briefly discuss two special cases.
These limit cases serve as benchmarks for the subsequent comparative static analysis and
facilitate the interpretation of results.
Corollary 1 Benchmark analysis:
a) If there are no liquidity traders (µX = 0), the market puts no weight on the firm’s
earnings report.




. This result is independent of the relative amounts of other trader types in
the market.
The first benchmark considers a scenario where there are no liquidity traders. In such a
market, the equilibrium price fully reveals the information of the informed traders’ private
value signal and because this signal is on average correct by the law of large numbers, it
holds that pv = 1. In this case, the market puts zero weight on the firm’s accounting report
because it contains no incremental value information to investors given that the price fully
reflects firm value. Consequently, the manager has no incentives to manage earnings.
The second benchmark considers the opposite extreme. If there are no informed traders,
the accounting report is the only source of value information available to investors because
the price contains no additional information on the asset value beyond the accounting re-
port. In this case, there is no learning from prices and all risk-averse investors value the
firm based on the same information. Accordingly, the price response to the accounting re-
port reflects its information content on a stand-alone basis and equals the slope coefficient
of an univariate regression of v on r. Because the demand of liquidity traders only makes
the price signal redundant but carries no information on firm value, the relative fraction of
liquidity traders in the market is immaterial for the price reaction on the firm’s accounting
report.
We examine next how changes in the distribution of trader types affect the price response
to the firm’s accounting report. To this end, we calibrate the comparative static analysis
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of our model so that any increase in the relative fractions of informed, limited attention
and liquidity traders reduces the amount of uninformed traders and vice versa. Taking
the group of uninformed investors as the numeraire for changes in the investor population
allows us to consider the consequences of structural changes within the group of risk-
averse investors as well as changes between the group of risk-averse investors and the
population of liquidity traders. This procedure is already reflected in the expressions for
the equilibrium price coefficients in Proposition 1 where we have used the fact that µU =
1 − µI − µL − µX to determine the expressions for the coefficients of the equilibrium price
in (5).
Corollary 2 A relative increase of the fractions of informed (limited attention) traders
within a given population of risk-averse investors implies the following changes to the







A higher share of informed traders reduces the price reaction to the firm’s accounting
report and thereby also the expected level of earnings management. The reason for this
result is quite intuitive. A higher fraction of informed investors reduces the average valu-
ation risk in the population of investors so that the demand for the firm’s shares becomes
more sensitive to changes in the firm’s asset price. This effect is equivalent to a higher
value of the term T in equation (20) which is inversely related to the valuation risk in the
population of investors. Because the total share of risk-averse investors remains constant
at 1−µX and all investors in this group consider the firm’s accounting report in proportion
to its precision in determining their demand for the firm’s shares, a change of the com-
position within this group of investors has no impact on the demand effect of the firm’s
accounting report as measured by the denominator in equations (14) and (19). Thus, with
a constant demand effect of the accounting report and a stronger reaction to changes of
the asset price, the equilibrium weight on the firm’s accounting report is decreasing in
µI . This result also implies that a larger fraction of more sophisticated investors partly
protects the firm against the manager’s incentives to manage the firm’s earnings.
The opposite effect occurs if the fraction of limited attention traders within the group of
uninformed investors becomes larger. While the demand effect of the accounting report
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remains constant again, a higher value of µL implies that fewer investors use the informa-
tion contained in the firm’s stock price to value the firm. Therefore, this change in the
composition of the investor base is equivalent to an increase in the average valuation risk
in the market. Because the higher information risk reduces the aggregate demand effect
of changes in the firm’s asset price (lower T ) for a given demand effect of the accounting
report, a higher fraction of limited attention traders increases the market response to the
firm’s accounting report and thereby the managers’ incentives to manage earnings.
Having established that a lower degree of investor sophistication within the group of risk-
averse investors increases the expected level of earnings management in the capital mar-
ket, we study how an increasing fraction of liquidity traders affects the market reaction
to the firm’s accounting report. Provided that such a change in the investor base implies
that a higher fraction of traders in the market places random orders for the firm’s shares
independent of the available information about firm value, an increasing fraction of liq-
uidity traders can be regarded as a further deterioration of investor sophistication in the
stock market. Perhaps surprisingly, our next result shows that such a decrease of investor
sophistication does not necessarily translate into a higher level of earnings management.
Proposition 2 A higher fraction of liquidity traders in the market can increase or de-
crease the price response to the firm’s accounting report. Let µ̄X = 1 − µI − µL denote the
maximum fraction of liquidity traders for given values of other trader types in the market.
There exists a unique threshold µ∗X such that:
a) If µ∗X ∈ (0, µ̄X), the equilibrium price response pr is increasing in µX if µX ≤ µ∗X and
decreasing in µX if µX > µ
∗
X.
b) If µ∗X > µ̄X, the equilibrium price response pr is increasing in µX for all values of µX.
An increasing fraction of liquidity traders has two effects on the market demand for the
firm’s shares. On one hand, it increases the aggregate valuation risk in the market which
reduces the stock price sensitivity of market demand (lower T ). This effect is the same as
for an increasing fraction of limited attention traders albeit for different reasons. On the
other hand, a higher fraction of liquidity traders implies that a lower number of investors
learn from the firm’s earnings report and the information contained in the stock price.
Thus, a larger share of liquidity traders reduces the precision of the price signal (lower
ρ) which reduces the investor’s ability to learn from price. However, different from an
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increase of µL, an increase of µX also reduces the fraction of investors (1−µX) that consider
the firm’s accounting report in their demand for the firm’s shares.
While a lower demand reaction on the firm’s accounting report reduces the equilibrium
price response to r, a lower price sensitivity increases the market response to the firm’s
accounting report. Put differently, an increasing number of liquidity traders in the mar-
ket reduces the numerator and the denominator of the equilibrium response coefficient in
equations (14) and (19) so that the overall effect of µX on pr is ambiguous. Whenever
the price sensitivity effect in the denominator is weaker than the impact of a lower price
response to the accounting report in the numerator, a higher fraction of liquidity traders
reduces the price response to the firm’s accounting report and vice versa. More funda-
mentally, these results imply that a lower degree of investor sophistication in the stock
market can reduce the manager’s earnings management incentives rather than increasing
them.
Our next result shows how changes in the composition of the investor base affect the
relative importance of accounting information to investors.
Proposition 3 Any change in the price response to the firm’s accounting report caused
by a change in the composition of the investor base has the opposite effect on the price
response to the value signal contained in p. The effect is proportional to the information








for n ∈ {I, L, X}. (22)
According to Proposition 3, a higher price reaction to the firm’s earnings report goes hand
in hand with a lower price reaction to the value signal contained in the market price. The
reason for this relation is that a change in the composition of the investor base changes
the relative impact of the two value signals for the demand of shares. For example, an
increasing fraction of limited attention investors does not affect the marginal demand
change induced by the accounting report but it reduces the marginal demand induced
by the value information contained in the share price because fewer investors consider
this information in their investment decision. Because the price sensitivity of demand in
the denominator of pr and pv goes down and the relative change of the demand effect
is stronger than the change of the price sensitivity, pr is increasing in µL whereas pv is
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(1 − µX) · (τη + τv) · ρ2 · τx
T 2
, (24)
the ratio of marginal changes is a negative constant and proportional to the coefficient of
an univariate regression of v on r. As we show in the proof of the proposition, the same
relation holds for the changes in the fraction of other investor types.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relation between the equilibrium price responses to r and v
and a varying fraction of liquidity traders. Figure 1 illustrates case a) in Proposition 2. It
can be seen that the pr is increasing in µX up to the point where µX = µ
∗
X and decreasing
beyond this point. The opposite effect holds for pv which is decreasing in µX as long as
µX ≤ µ∗X and increasing beyond this point. Figure 2 illustrates case b) in Proposition 2. It
can be seen that pr is strictly increasing in µX whereas pv is strictly decreasing in µX.
Figure 1 Ambiguous effect of liquidity traders on earnings management
(µU = µI = 0.1, γ = 1.0, τε = τη = τv = τx = 0.5)
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Figure 2 Strictly increasing earnings management
(µU = µI = 0.35, γ = 1.0, τε = τη = τv = τx = 0.5)
3.5 Price efficiency
This section studies how the composition of the investor base affects the informational
efficiency of the capital market. Market or price efficiency refers to the question on how
well the market price of a firm’s stock represents its fundamental value (Goldstein and
Yang, 2017). In this paper, we measure price efficiency as the relative difference between
the variance of the fundamental value and the conditional value variance for a given stock
price:
PE =
Var [ṽ] − Var [ṽ|p]
Var [ṽ]
, where PE ∈ [0, 1]. (25)
This measure is defined so that higher values indicate a more efficient capital market.
That is, if the price is a perfect measure of firm value, it holds that PE = 1 and if the price
contains no value-relevant information, this measure takes the value of zero.4
4 There are several measures of price efficiency in the literature. For example, Goldstein and Yang (2017)
define market efficiency as the reciprocal of the conditional variance Var
[
ṽ|p] . Consistent with our measure
in (25), a higher conditional variance indicates a less efficient market.
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Corollary 3 An increasing fraction of informed traders increases price efficiency. An







Our results in Corollary 3 are quite intuitive. A higher fraction of informed traders in-
creases the efficiency of the stock market, whereas a higher fraction of liquidity traders
reduces price efficiency. The reason for the first result is that informed traders possess
private information about firm value that is reflected in the market price through their
demand for the firm’s stock. A higher fraction of traders leads to more informed trade
and makes the market price more informative about the fundamental value. On the other
hand, a higher fraction of liquidity traders implies that a lower fraction of the total trading
volume is based on information about the firm’s fundamentals so that the price becomes
a less precise measure of firm value.
Considering our measure of price efficiency in (25), these results can be formally ex-
plained by the effect of a changing trader population on the variance of the stock price p̃
and the covariance between p̃ and ṽ. If we substitute for the conditional variance in the





which indicates that a higher covariance between value and price increases the price effi-
ciency and a higher variance of the stock price decrease price efficiency. Consistent with
our results in Corollary 3, we find that a higher fraction of informed traders increases
Cov(ṽ, p̃) and a higher fraction of liquidity traders decreases Cov(ṽ, p̃). However, we also
find that the same effects hold for the variance of the price so that there are countervailing
effects that reduce the price efficiency in the first case and increases it in the latter case.
The presence of these effects is intuitive if we consider that:
Var( p̃) = τv ·Cov(ṽ, p̃)2 + τ−1η · p2r + τ−1x · p2x, (28)
which implies that a higher covariance increases price variance and vice versa for a lower
covariance. However, because the price efficiency is measured as a ratio, the comparative
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static analysis must consider the relative changes of the terms in the numerator and the
denominator to determine the sign of the overall effect. As we demonstrate in the ap-
pendix, for the share of informed traders the relative increase of the term in the numerator
of equation (27) is higher than the relative increase of the price variance in the denomina-
tor. It follows that an increasing fraction of informed investors always increases the price
efficiency. Likewise, the relative decrease of the covariance term in the numerator of (27)
caused by an increasing fraction of liquidity traders is stronger than the decrease of the
total price variance in the denominator.
More fundamentally, the results in Corollary 3 suggest that a lower degree of investor so-
phistication generally reduces price efficiency. Our next result shows that this conclusion
is premature and does not always hold if we vary the degree of investor sophistication
within the group of risk-averse traders.
Proposition 4 A higher fraction of limited attention traders in the market can increase
or decrease the price efficiency. Let µ̄L = 1 − µI − µX denote the maximum fraction of











b) If µ∗L > µ̄L, price efficiency is strictly increasing in µL for all values of µL.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the results in Proposition 4 suggest that markets with a lower
fraction of sophisticated investors can exhibit a higher price efficiency. The reason for this
effect is twofold. As noted for the share of liquidity traders, a higher fraction of limited
attention traders reduces the covariance between the stock price and firm value because a
lower fraction of investors considers the value information contained in the stock price in
its investment decisions. This effect also reduces the price variance which is decreasing
in µL. However, because the demand of liquidity traders also determines the noise of the
price signal sp, less use of this signal by market participants reduces the weight of the
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price response to the demand of liquidity traders which further decreases the variance of
the stock price. If this effect is sufficiently pronounced, the relative reduction of the price
variance exceeds the relative reduction of the covariance term in (27) and (28) so that
the price efficiency is increasing in µL. Considering this effect and the structure of the
price variance in (28), it is intuitively clear why µ∗L is increasing in the fraction of liquidity
traders (µX) and decreasing in τx.
The two solutions described in Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figures 3 (case a)) and 4
(case b)). The first case in Figure 3 considers a scenario where the price efficiency is
concave in µL, increasing up to the value of µ
∗
L and decreasing beyond that point. It is
only in the latter region that a lower investor sophistication reduces price efficiency. As
illustrated in Figure 4, the price efficiency is generally increasing in µL if the reduction of
the price reaction to the demand of liquidity traders has a sufficiently high impact on the
price variance. In Figure 4, this impact is captured by a higher risk aversion which has
an equivalent effect on price efficiency because it implies that investors generally put a
higher weight on x which increases the magnitude of the additional variance reduction in
the same way as a higher fraction of liquidity traders.
Figure 3 Ambiguous effect of limited attention on price efficiency
(µI = µX = 0.1, γ = 1.0, τε = τη = τv = τx = 0.5)
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Figure 4 Strictly increasing price efficiency in limited attention
(µI = µX = 0.1, γ = 2.0, τε = τη = τv = τx = 0.5)
3.6 Conclusion
We study how the degree of investor sophistication affects firms’ incentives for earnings
management and market efficiency. Our analysis features a signal jamming model of
earnings management in the context of a linear rational expectations model with hetero-
geneous investors. A manager with unknown reporting objectives observes an unbiased
signal about firm value and issues a biased accounting report to the capital market. The
market features four trader types: informed investors, uninformed investors, limited at-
tention traders and liquidity traders. While all other traders are risk-averse portfolio in-
vestors considering different sources of information about firm value in their investment
decisions, liquidity traders place orders for the firm’s shares for exogenous reasons.
All traders observe the firm’s accounting report but informed traders also observe a pri-
vate signal of the firm’s asset value. Because the informed traders’ private information
is reflected in their investment decisions, the share price is informative about firm value.
In contrast to informed and uninformed investors that always use the stock price as an
additional value signal, limited attention traders exhibit constrained information process-
ing capacity that prevent them from extracting the value information from the market
price and restrict them to value the firm based on the public accounting report. Using this
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framework allows us to rank the four investor types in our model according to their degree
of sophistication beginning with informed investors, followed by the uninformed traders,
limited attention traders and liquidity traders as the least sophisticated trader category.
We first show that an increased fraction of informed investors decreases the price response
to the firm’s accounting report and the equilibrium level of earnings management. Consis-
tent with conventional wisdom, these results suggest that an increasing degree of investor
sophistication reduces the price response to biased accounting reports and thereby miti-
gates the firm’s incentives for earnings management. Perhaps surprisingly, this intuition
no longer holds if we consider an increasing share of liquidity traders. Particularly, we
find that a larger proportion of liquidity traders in the market can actually cause a lower
price response to the firms accounting report, thereby reducing the manager’s manipula-
tion incentives.
We also study how the degree of investor sophistication affects the price efficiency of
the stock market and find that an increasing fraction of informed investors increases the
efficiency of the stock market in the sense that the price becomes a more precise measure
of value. The opposite effect occurs if the fraction of liquidity traders increases. Most
surprisingly we find that price efficiency is increasing in the fraction of limited attention
traders whenever their presence has a stronger impact on the volatility of the stock price
than on its covariance with the firm value.
The results of our study indicate that the degree of investor sophistication can have am-
biguous effects on the market response to biased accounting signals and the overall ef-
ficiency of capital markets. Our findings also suggest that carefully chosen measures of
investor sophistication are crucial for studying the empirical association between investor
sophistication and market outcomes.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition rotect1
According to (1), the manager maximizes her utility for a given conjecture about the stock
price p,
Um = p0 + pr · r + pv · v + px · x −
1
2
· (r − v − η)2, (30)
with respect to her report r. Given the realizations of her value signal v and reporting
noise η, the manager’s optimal report takes the form:
r = pr + v + η. (31)
Matching coefficient with the conjectured equilibrium strategy in equations (4) then yields:
r0 = pr and rv = rη = 1. (32)
For a given information endowment and conjecture about the manager’s report, all risk-
averse traders determine the conditional moments of firm value and their demand for the
firm’s shares as defined in (6). Matching supply and demand considering the expressions
in (9) and (10) as well as the demand of liquidity traders, the market clearing condition in
(11) reads as:
(1 − µX) · DL + (µI + µU) ·
ρ2 · τx
γ





· (si − p) di + µX · x = Q. (33)
Considering the expressions of DL in (7), sp in (8) as well as the facts that
∑
n µU = 1 and
∫ µI
0
εi · di = 0 by the law of the large numbers, we can solve the market clearing condition
for p. Rearranging terms and matching coefficients with the conjectured equilibrium price
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function in equation (5) yields the expressions in the proposition:
p0 = −
(1 − µX) · pr · τη + Q · γ
T
, pr =




(1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε
T
, px =
(1 − µL − µX) · ρ · τx + µX · γ
T
, (35)











Proof of Corollary 1
In the absence of liquidity traders (µX = 0), the price coefficients in Proposition 1 take the
values:
p0 = pr = px = 0, pv = 1. (38)
If there are no informed traders (µI = 0), the price coefficients in Proposition 1 take the
values:
p0 = −
pr · (1 − µX) · τη + γ · Q




, pv = 0, px =
γ · µX
(1 − µX) · (τη + τv)
. (39)
Evidently, pr is independent of the distribution of traders in the market in this case. 
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Proof of Corollary 2
Differentiating the equilibrium coefficient pr in Proposition 1 with respect to the relative




















= τε + 2 ·
(
1 − µL − µX
µI
)
· ρ2 · τx and
∂T
∂µL
= −ρ2 · τx.

Proof of Proposition 2
Differentiating the equilibrium coefficient pr in Proposition 1 with respect to the fraction



















= −(τη + τv) −
(
1 + 2 ·
(
1 − µL − µX
µX
))
· ρ2 · τx < 0. (43)
Because T > 0 and ∂T
∂µX
< 0, the sign of the derivative in (42) is ambiguous and depends
on the sign of the expression F(µX). Because it holds that:
lim
µX → 0




> 0 for small values of µX. However, because T is positive and de-
creasing concave in µX, it holds that:
∂F(µX)
∂µX
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Considering the parameter range of µX ∈ (0, µ̄X), where µ̄X = 1 − µI − µL, there exists a
critical value µ∗X that solves the equation F(µ
∗
X) = 0 for µX whenever it holds that F(µ̄X) >
0. Otherwise, if F(µ̄X) < 0, pr is increasing in µX for all µX ∈ (0, µ̄X).
Using the expressions in (36) and (43), the critical value of µ∗X can be found as the solution
of the equation:
µI · τε −
(
(1 − µX) + (2 − 3 · µX) ·
(
1 − µL − µX
µX
))
· ρ2 · τx = 0. (46)

Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating the equilibrium coefficient pv in Proposition 1 with respect to the trader






























for n ∈ {I, L, X}. (49)

Proof of Corollary 3
Using the fact that:
Cov(ṽ, p̃) = (pr + pv) · τ−1v , (50)
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we can write the price efficiency in (27) as follows:
PE =
τ−1v · (pr + pv)2
τ−1v · (pr + pv)2 + τ−1η · p2r + τ−1x · p2x
. (51)
Because all coefficients of the pricing equation in Proposition 1 have the same denomina-
tor, this expression can be simplified to the form:
PE =
A(µI , µL, µX)
A(µI , µL, µX) + B(µL, µX)
, (52)
where A(µI , µL, µX) = τ
−1
v · (αr + αp)2, B(µL, µX) = τ−1η · α2r + τ−1x · α2x
and αr, αp, and αx are the numerators of the pricing coefficients in Proposition 1, that is:
αr = (1 − µX) · τη,
αp = (1 − µL − µX) · ρ2 · τx + µI · τε,
αx = (1 − µL − µX) · ρ · τx + µX · γ.
The price efficiency is increasing in trader fraction µn, if
∆(·) = ∂A(·)
∂µn
· B(·) − A(·) · ∂B(·)
∂µn
(53)
is positive and decreasing if ∆(·) < 0. Considering that:
∂A(·)
∂µI
= 2 · τε
τv




it is easy to see that PE is increasing in µI .
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Using the definitions of αr, αp and αx and rearranging terms, we find that:
∆(·) ∝ − γ · (ax · (ar + αp − µI · τε) + ap · µX · γ) − (γ · µX − ρ · µL · τx)2 · τη < 0. (57)
It follows that PE is decreasing in µX. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Following the derivations in the proof of Corollary 3, we note first that an increasing
number of limited attention traders has the following effects on the terms in (52):
∂A(·)
∂µL
= −2 · τ−1v · (αr + αp) · ρ2 · τx < 0, (58)
∂B(·)
∂µX
= −2 · αx · ρ < 0. (59)
Using the definitions of αr, αp and αx and rearranging terms, we find that:
∆(·) ∝ G(µL) = (γ · µX − ρ · µL · τx) · ar · ρ · τx. (60)
Evidently, G(µL) is positive as µL approaches zero and decreasing in µL. Considering the





that solves the equation in G(µ∗L) = 0 for µL whenever it holds that G(µ̄L) < 0. Otherwise,
if G(µ̄L) > 0, PE is increasing in µL for all µL ∈ (0, µ̄L). 
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